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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the culture of coercive voluntarism in Georgia during the First World 
War using studies of legislation and vigilance, the press, and the Georgia Council of Defense. 
Each of the themes studied demonstrates how organizations attempted to coerce support of the 
US war effort in Georgia. The study focuses on Georgia as a single state rather than simply as 
part of the South, as most other studies have done. The purpose is to challenge studies that have 
emphasized resistance only, which presents an incomplete picture of Georgia’s domestic scene 
during the war. In fact, many elements within Georgia—at the state, local, and citizen level—
actively supported the war, often with the same level of intention, if not the same results, as did 
other areas of the country. Georgia attempted to comply with federal imperatives while preserv-
ing its rights as a state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 1918, the United States was fighting a war overseas as well as on the home front. 
The previous month, Congress had toughened the Espionage Act with amendments that further 
limited Americans’ abilities to speak out or publish against the government’s war with Germany. 
It also endeavored to enforce loyalty among Americans. In this tense atmosphere, an editorial in 
the Atlanta Constitution asserted that “Pro-Germanism must be eradicated; it must be stamped 
out. Not a vestige of it must or can safely be tolerated.”1 The editorial highly lauded the civic ac-
tions of a local woman to maintain loyalty in the city. She had written the Constitution to com-
plain about a German family who lived in a suburb close to downtown. A woman in that German 
household had refused to carry the writer’s knitted article to a Red Cross station, “boldly” refus-
ing to do anything “against the Germans.” The same German woman also allegedly tried to get a 
neighbor to take down a proudly flown American flag. Adding insult to injury, the angry Atlanta 
woman wrote, the industrious but disloyal German family would “buy cheap material and make 
little war souvenirs and have the audacity to profane our flag by selling these things to our boys 
at Fort Gordon for $2 that cost them not more than 50 cents to make.” The paper unequivocally 
supported the letter writer, and in fact stated that she was remiss in her duty by simply writing 
the paper about it: “If she knows this [German] woman or any other person to be disloyal to the 
American flag—or, in absence of proof, if she has knowledge upon which to base even reasona-
ble suspicion—her own first duty to the flag is to report the facts to the federal authorities or to 
the police!”2 
Before America’s entry into the First World War, there was widespread resistance 
throughout the American South against the United States meddling in what was still at that time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Editorial, “Disloyalty,” Atlanta Constitution, 16 June 1918, C6. 
2 Ibid. 
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called “the European War.” But after the United States became an Allied belligerent in April 
1917, most of the country, including many in the South, rallied behind President Wilson as he 
led the country into war. Some did so out of patriotism; others did so to comply with restrictive 
laws passed to enforce war mobilization. The extent to which such laws were necessary, and 
what impact they may have had on overall support, is open to debate. Historian Jeanette Keith, 
for example, has extensively studied southern resistance and thinks historians overestimate the 
public’s support of Wilson and the administration during the war. Restrictive laws were contro-
versial, yet Keith concludes that government crackdowns on American rights were “not . . . silly. 
The national government reacted seriously to a rational fear that dissent, if allowed to continue, 
would grow until it impeded the war effort.”3 Resistance in the South especially focused on the 
Selective Service Act, which Congress passed to muster a deployable army to lead America’s 
fight in Europe. This southern resistance has been chalked up to lack of concern for the war as 
well as ignorance.  
As a southern state, Georgia is often lumped in with the history of the South in general, 
but Georgia’s role in US mobilization cannot be overstated. Georgia was a staging ground for 
training and deployment of US troops, as well as host to camps that housed German POWs. 
Many Americans who were convicted of violating the wartime Espionage Act or the Selective 
Service Act were incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta. The state’s unique contribu-
tions to the war effort and its unique experiences have generally not been studied and shared. 
The domestic scene in the United States on the eve of its entry into the First World War is 
a much-studied topic, as is the collective role of the American South in the conflict. In this study, 
I further explore the atmosphere of war support that overtook the country in World War I, and I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jeanette Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight: Race, Class, and Power in the Rural South during the First 
World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 136. 
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expand the southern theme by exploring the less emphasized cultural currents of acceptance and 
support, even in the face of resistance and dissent, to tell a fuller story of how the war was expe-
rienced in Georgia by Georgians.  
In this thesis I argue that the spirit of coercive voluntarism that swept the country when it 
became a belligerent in World War I applied quite strongly in Georgia, as well, though many 
studies that discuss the state do so based on its geographical inclusion in the South and focus al-
most exclusively on resistance and opposition. Basically, coercive voluntarism is the action at 
some influential level—be it governmental, legislative, or social—to convince citizens or groups 
of the need for a certain set of behaviors or compliance and how best to express those behaviors. 
From 1917 into 1919, American citizens felt this coercive force to wholeheartedly support the 
war effort; coercion manifested in many ways and permeated day-to-day lives, whether through 
required draft registration, labor enforcement laws, or even the voluntary rationing of food. This 
study also defines the role Georgia played in the federal government’s restrictions on civil liber-
ties and suspension of constitutional rights and discusses how national and local events intersect-
ed, leading to coercive laws, civilian vigilance, and organizational drives to bring the Georgia 
populace into compliance with state and federal prowar efforts.  
I also explore the press response to active political resistance—particularly that by Geor-
gia’s US Senator Thomas Hardwick and, to a lesser extent, Senator Hoke Smith—to expand the 
Georgia experience beyond the well-studied aspects of draft resistance and the antiwar antics of 
populist Tom Watson; this is important because it shows how the press helped to create a percep-
tion of what was expected of a patriotic citizen. I explore the discourse for influences that pre-
ceded decisions by local municipalities to pass ordinances related to wartime dissent, such as the 
“Bailey Anti-German law” cryptically alluded to in a 1918 Atlanta Constitution article about the 
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arrest of an Atlanta man on charges of disloyal speech.4 For example, did newspaper accounts, 
which generally supported government restrictions on liberty, accurately reflect the attitudes of 
the general populace? For that matter, did what Georgia newspapers published in this atmosphere 
of paranoia and government restriction really reflect what newspapers themselves felt about the 
war and the war effort? Or did newspapers feel pressure to conform to forego the possibility of 
legalized censorship of the press (which was a very real threat before the passage of the Espio-
nage Act in June 1917)? I also explore in depth the powers and accomplishments of the Georgia 
Council of Defense, which reported to the Council of National Defense and has hitherto been 
included as part of broader studies of the South rather than looked at individually. I use these 
themes to explain how Georgians interpreted federal, state, and local government decisions.  
These governmental responses impacted US citizens everywhere, including many who were of-
ten otherwise untouched in their daily lives by international events.  
In Georgia, many citizens had valid reasons for opposing the war, as did Americans  
everywhere; like other Americans, those in Georgia who resisted the draft or opposed federal 
restrictions often did so in an environment of local official support. I present in this study cases 
of wartime coercion on local levels that can offer a new background for viewing arguments of 
resistance by showing that resistance and support were much more complex and intertwined  
than is indicated by many studies that view Georgia and the South from a northern or national  
perspective. 
 
Historiography and Context 
The nation overall rallied with Wilson when war came, but that doesn’t suggest a blind 
following or imply complete support. It was, rather, a complex and rapid evolution from neutrali-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “Jailed on Charge of Hoping Germany Will Defeat US,” Atlanta Constitution, 4 August 1918. 
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ty to a war footing driven by events in the war itself. Though one must be cautious when discuss-
ing the “American public” lest the multitude of voices and opinions be lost in generalization, 
scholars agree that a majority of Americans viewed the war with sympathy for the Allies. This 
reflected the country’s almost century-long alliance with Great Britain but also spoke to the suc-
cess of British propaganda campaigns in the United States. Even before the war had officially 
begun in 1914, the British, in the hours before war was declared, had cut the trans-Atlantic cable 
connecting the United States and Germany, effectively cutting off US news sources from direct 
communication with the central powers. This allowed the British to manage and direct war news 
as well as disseminate anti-German propaganda. Common stories of German atrocities included 
the Kaiser’s soldiers raping Belgian women and the even more savage stories of German soldiers 
cooking and eating Belgian babies.5  
Before we transition to this active support however, we must look at Wilson’s failed poli-
cy of neutrality. Aside from the obvious intention of not committing US troops to a European 
fight that killed hundreds of thousands in its first months, neutrality was generally twofold. First, 
Wilson’s initial pacifism was geared at saving a place for America at the head of the postwar 
peace table. Wilson wanted America to be, as much as possible, a “disinterested party” to medi-
ate peace when the European powers grew tired of slaughtering each other.6 Only by remaining 
outside the fight could America accomplish that aim. Second, and perhaps most important given 
the prescience of the fear, Wilson “believed to the very end that participation in the war held out 
the greatest threat to the nation’s democratic values and institutions,” especially the sacred rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Celia Malone Kingsbury, For Home and Country: World War I Propaganda on the Home Front (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 2010), 231. 
6 Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Char-
lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 9. 
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of free speech and assembly.7 Ironically, the Espionage Act, which the president pushed for after 
war began, would make Wilson’s fears reality.  
The US public generally wished to avoid war, although Germany challenged that neutral 
spirit when a submarine sank the passenger liner Lusitania without warning off the coast of Ire-
land on 8 May 1915. Almost 1,200 passengers drowned, including 124 Americans. This event is 
commonly cited as almost setting the United States to war with Germany almost two years be-
fore it actually did, but Robert Tucker, whose historical studies have included Wilson and neu-
trality for fifty years, complicates that argument. Tucker agrees the sinking was so repulsive to 
the American public that if Wilson had abandoned neutrality and sought a breaking of diplomatic 
ties or a declaration of war, the public would probably have backed him. Wilson, however, 
feared that history would judge him by asking, “Why didn’t he try peaceably to settle this ques-
tion with Germany?”8 (Indeed, Wilson noted after the sinking of the Lusitania that “there is such 
a thing as a man too proud to fight,” words that haunted him for the rest of his years.) More 
hawkish politicians, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, however, immediately 
judged Wilson for not asking for a declaration of war over the 1915 incident and later accused 
the president of hypocrisy when he did ask for war in 1917.9  
The ensuing diplomatic uproar over the Lusitania lasted almost two months, mainly be-
cause Germany wisely ignored US demands, counting on American ire to cool over the incident 
(which it did).10 By the end of July, Wilson’s initial demand for a complete end to Germany’s 
unrestricted submarine warfare on merchant vessels had dwindled to a call for Germany to ac-
cept that Americans traveling on belligerents’ ships should be able to do so without fear of attack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 10, 202. 
8 Ibid., 109. 
9 Ibid., 197. 
10 Ibid., 110. 
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without warning; Wilson argued that in essence the United States and Germany were fighting for 
the same thing: freedom of the seas.11 Tucker sees the possibility of war over the Lusitania as 
overstated and oversimplified by historians; he demonstrates that Wilson himself never seriously 
foresaw war as a possible outcome in the diplomatic furor that followed the sinking. Once he did 
realize the possibility, he became conciliatory and gave up the supreme fight for freedom of the 
seas in favor of maintaining American neutrality.12 In fact, the sternest note by the Americans to 
Germany over unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915 was penned and sent by Robert Lansing, 
who replaced William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state, without the president’s permission 
after the Germans sank yet another passenger ship, the Arabic, in August.13 The Lusitania crisis, 
Tucker says, in effect destroyed Wilson’s notions of neutrality and left the president “adrift, sus-
pended between a past he could no longer recover and a . . . future he could not yet bring himself 
to accept.”14  
Still, in Tucker’s view, war was inevitable. Wilson’s 1916 reelection mantle as the man 
who kept America out of the war was destined to be short-lived. The issue of American rights on 
the high seas (combined with other factors such as the Zimmerman telegram) led to war in 1917. 
Wilson absolutely would not backpedal from his claim for Americans to safely travel on the 
ships of belligerents; doing so would have showed weakness. (This, in fact, was the reason Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan, a devout pacifist who realized early on that Wilson’s tenacity in holding to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 122. 
12 Ibid., 128. 
13 Ibid., 36–37. Lansing told Germany if it didn’t promise to end “surprise attacks on vessels carrying passengers . . . 
the United States would certainly declare war on Germany.” Germany did not call Lansing’s bluff, and Lansing 
claimed he had done what Wilson would have wanted done if the president better understood the legalities of the 
matter. 
14 Ibid., 130. 
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this freedom-of-the-seas standard would inevitably draw the United States into the war, resigned 
as secretary of state over the US response to Germany over the Lusitania.)15 
July 1916 presented another perspective on neutrality and a challenge to Wilson’s usual 
anglophilia. In that month, an unarmed German merchant submarine designed to break the Brit-
ish naval blockade docked in Baltimore Harbor on a trade mission. This U-boat, the Deutsch-
land, successfully crossed the Atlantic and evaded the British navy. An adventure-loving Ameri-
can public greeted the voyage and the trade mission with great enthusiasm. The U-boat captain, 
Paul König, recounted in a book published that year the warm reception afforded him and his 
crew by both the public and the Wilson administration, even claiming to have met with the US 
president.16 Tucker’s book doesn’t address this visit specifically—in fact, the one great fault of 
his otherwise illuminating study is the unexplained absence of most of the summer and fall of 
1916—but he does allude to the political atmosphere in which it occurred. During the summer of 
1916, Wilson began to broaden his view of the Allied blockade on Germany, obtaining “from 
Congress authority to take severe retaliatory measures against any nation discriminating against 
American firms or interfering with American mail.” Though Tucker doesn’t mention the 
Deutschland, this declaration was in direct response to Great Britain’s threat to blacklist Ameri-
can companies who traded Canadian nickel—integral to Germany’s war effort—for German 
dyestuffs brought on the Deutschland, which the British considered a war vessel despite its ap-
parent lack of armaments.17 In fact, Wilson’s diplomatic “back off” message to Great Britain 
over this incident is in many ways more harshly worded than the warnings to Germany after the 
sinking of the Lusitania.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid.,  140. 
16 Dwight R. Messimer, The Merchant U-Boat: Adventures of the Deutschland, 1916–1918 (Annapolis: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1988), 70. 
17 Messimer, Merchant U-Boat, 51; Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 209. 
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Neutrality ended in spring 1917 when the United States declared war on Germany. It was 
a radical transition after the relatively warmer relations of the previous fall and early winter. 
Germany, in collusion with the Wilson administration, had offered a peace overture to the Allies 
in December 1916; the Allies promptly declined to deal. Britain and France refused to ease the 
naval blockade, despite the blockade’s increasingly sour view by the United States. The Allies 
gambled, rightly, that if they refused Wilson’s attempts at orchestrating peace, the naval block-
ade would either starve Germany into submission or force the Germans to restart unrestricted 
submarine warfare.18  
Thus, Woodrow Wilson’s administration had followed what the president deemed “strict 
neutrality” for the first thirty months of the European war, from late summer 1914 until late Jan-
uary 1917. On 31 January 1917, Germany, which had thus far attempted to keep America out of 
the war since fall 1915, declared unrestricted submarine warfare on the naval vessels of any na-
tion supplying the Allies—in essence, unrestricted submarine warfare on the United States. Ger-
many gambled that its U-boats would cripple Allied shipping and bring the war to conclusion 
before the United States had time to muster, train, and deploy an army to Europe. The ultimate 
tenet of Wilson’s neutrality—that of Americans’ freedom to travel and trade without harassment 
on the seas—was dismissed again by the Germans, so the United States went to war.  
Wilson had barely won reelection in 1916 under the slogan “He Kept Us Out of the 
War.” But confronted with the resurgent German U-boat threat, the president did a complete 
about-face and guided the United States into the conflict with a single-minded determination to 
mobilize every aspect of American society toward victory. The subsequent debates on how 
America raised its army (through a new selective service military draft) and suppressed constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and expression have dominated the domestic history of the Unit-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 211. 
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ed States in World War I. It is very much a story about the coercion of “volunteerism” and the 
origins of civil rights in the United States. Regional differences offered multiple challenges to a 
government trying to mobilize an entire nation for war; opponents who claimed the right of free 
speech forced a constitutional reckoning of the First Amendment for the first time by the Su-
preme Court.  
These episodes cannot completely explain the complexity of the rollercoaster ride that 
was American neutrality in the first years of the Great War. They do, however, illustrate the 
wide-ranging diplomatic lengths Wilson went to in order to maintain neutrality. And once neu-
trality was discarded, Wilson’s subsequent war directives left no doubt that he had moved be-
yond the “too proud to fight” statement he had uttered after the Lusitania. A month after his se-
cond inauguration, the president reelected on the slogan “he kept us out of the war” asked Con-
gress to declare war on Germany. 
Particularly in the South, support for the war before America’s entry as a belligerent was 
tepid at best. The South was still very rural in attitudes as well as demographics. Prior to Ameri-
ca’s march to war after January 1917 (and following the discovery of the Zimmerman telegram), 
southerners generally opposed the war, as Great Britain’s very successful naval blockade of Im-
perial Germany hurt southern industry by restricting overseas markets for southern goods. Yet 
with the advent of war, the South mobilized both physically and psychologically in support of 
the war, as did the rest of the nation. Though strong pockets of resistance and dissent survived to 
nag the Wilson administration’s attempts to silence dissent and crush opposition, in Georgia, re-
sistance fought for voice among discourse that defended Georgia’s patriotism and loyalty.  
Of key interest to any study about the US domestic scene in World War I are two pivotal 
federal acts passed by Congress. The Selective Service Act was passed in May 1917 to erect a 
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framework by which the new Allied belligerent would mobilize a fighting force to deploy to the 
European theater. The Espionage Act passed the following month, laying unprecedented re-
strictions on war opposition and free speech.19 In Georgia, the Populist icon Tom Watson was 
one of the most outspoken opponents of compulsory military service to be found in the nation 
and immediately came up against the new federal espionage law. (Georgia Senator Thomas 
Hardwick was another vocal opponent of war and the draft; I discuss his views and Georgia’s 
response to them in chapter 2.) Watson’s attacks on the Wilson administration and his vehement 
opposition to the draft resulted in the barring of his weekly political publication, the Jeffersonian, 
from delivery by the postal service under the Espionage Act. Watson’s attacks threatened to land 
him in federal prison for violating the act, and in one case the United States put a man in prison 
for quoting a Watson speech.20 Watson’s opposition has been thoroughly documented, most no-
tably in C. Vann Woodward’s 1938 biography.21  
A caveat is in order here. Due to the climate of suspicion fostered by the federally en-
forced repression that dominated in the United States at that time, it could be very difficult to 
find what one could term an honest media assessment or opinion on public figures who stood in 
opposition to the Wilson regime. Indeed, it could be difficult to even find reasonably reliable, 
objective newspaper accounts of what may have been said in opposition to the American gov-
ernment’s execution of the war. The Espionage Act—especially after it was amended in May 
1918 (hereafter, I refer to this amended act as the Sedition Act to conform to historical conven-
tion, but it was more accurately a series of amendments to the Espionage Act to strengthen gov-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The Espionage Act passed on 15 June 1917, and was amended on 16 May 1918 to further restrict the expression 
of views critical of the government or the war effort. The 1918 amendments are often referred to as the Sedition Act 
as they deal with seditious speech, but it is more accurately the amended Espionage Act. Throughout this thesis, I 
refer to this amended version of the Espionage Act as the Sedition Act. 
20 H.C. Peterson and Gilbert Courtland Fite, Opponents of War, 1917–1918 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1957), 154. 
21 C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (1938; repr., Savannah, GA: Beehive Press, 1973). 
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ernment powers) to include more restrictions on free expression of opinion as it related to the 
war—promised to punish individuals and organizations that “willfully utter, print, write, or pub-
lish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States, or to 
promote the cause of its enemies . . .” 22  
In his book Democracy’s Prisoner, about the trial of Eugene Debs, Ernest Freeberg notes 
that many newspapers protected themselves by only publishing summaries of alleged seditious or 
disloyal speech rather than reprint an accused’s actual language, lest they expose themselves to 
accusations of disloyalty and potential prosecution under the “publish” rubric of the Espionage 
Act.23 
The issue of civil rights is closely tied to any study of US domestic World War I history. 
Many who spoke out against the war claimed a constitutional right under the First Amendment; 
yet despite almost a century and a half of existence, the First Amendment by 1917 had not yet 
been substantially analyzed or defined by the Supreme Court.24 Coercion from government and 
private citizens is generally argued as the psychological imperative that allowed the excesses of 
civil rights violations in this period. Background on the impact of the Espionage Act and the Se-
dition Act, as well as the consequences of the law and how it coerced citizens to follow the gov-
ernment, are provided by several important books. Paul L. Murphy’s influential 1979 book, 
World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties in the United States, explores the silence on civil 
liberties in the first 140 years of United States’ history and the emergence of the surveillance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See appendix for full citation as well as a comparison of the text of the Espionage Act in June 1917 versus the 
Sedition Act in May 1918. 
23 Ernest Freeberg, Democracy’s Prisoner: Eugene V. Debs, the Great War, and the Right to Dissent (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 88. 
24 Lee C. Bollinger and Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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state during the war.25 The best current tome on coercion and voluntarism is Christopher Capoz-
zola’s Uncle Sam Wants You. This book extends the argument of coercion to explore how it 
helped create the social and political obligations of a modern American citizen, highlighting “the 
primacy of political obligations to the federal government . . . [placing] law and legal process 
more firmly at the center of understandings of citizenship.”26 Richard Polenberg’s Fighting 
Faiths explores the Schenk and Abrams cases, two significant challenge to the Espionage Act.27 
These cases were among the first the Supreme Court weighed in on in the postwar free speech 
debate; Polenberg’s book illuminates how the highest court viewed the nascent subject of civil 
liberties and established the initial precedents of constitutional rights in trials that began after the 
war had already ended.  
The historiography of the South in World War I is expansive; Georgia’s specific place in 
this story, however, is sparse. Existing scholarship can be broken into several specific themes 
and lines of inquiry, including but not limited to race; gender; economics and labor; federal law 
and dissent; and political as well as popular resistance to the draft and to the free speech re-
strictions implemented by Congress. Previous scholarship tends to include Georgia in arguments 
about the South as a region rather than looking at Georgia in a specific and singular context. 
Jeanette Keith’s book Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight is a regional study of the South and its 
collective wartime experience.28 Keith explores issues of race and labor but also delves quite 
deeply into the elements of resistance and opposition to the war and specifically the draft. She 
explores in depth the impact of Tom Watson’s (and to a lesser degree, Thomas Hardwick’s)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties in the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1979). 
26 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 53. 
27 Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
28 Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight. 
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opposition to the war and also provides detailed accounts of Bureau of Investigation (the World 
War I precursor to the FBI) reports by agents tasked with tracking down draft dodgers. Rich 
Man’s War provides a springboard for further research into areas of Georgia significance that the 
book does not specifically address, such as local “Work or Fight” ordinances or prowar laws.  
Many well-known works explore the national domestic scene in World War I, such as 
David M. Kennedy’s Over Here and Ronald Schaffer’s America in the Great War.29 William 
Breen’s exhaustive 1984 study of mobilization, however, took one of the first in-depth looks at 
the state councils of defense that fell under the authority of the Council of National of Defense.30 
Mostly a national study looking at mobilization from the top down, Breen does endeavor to cov-
er the unique circumstances that befit the different sections of the country; he devotes an entire 
chapter to the South and Southwest. While the southern chapter mostly focuses on the less than 
zealous efforts by southern councils of defense (with the exception of Tennessee’s state council 
and its chairman, who were “beacons of light  . . . in the bleak southern landscape”31), he also 
points out that many northeastern states, which were generally very active, harbored suspicious 
and sometimes hostile feelings toward the national council.32  
Breen has little to say about Georgia specifically; what is said about the state is sourced 
only from national council records, leaving the archive of Georgia Council of Defense (GCD) 
records in Morrow, Georgia, unexplored. Breen cites only reports and memoranda on Georgia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984); Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (New York: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1991).  
30 William J. Breen, Uncle Sam at Home: Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of National 
Defense, 1917–1919 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984). 
31 Ibid., 99. 
32 Ibid., 54. As readers will see in the third chapter of this thesis, the Georgia Council of Defense was notorious for 
not responding to queries about its activities and accomplishments from the Council of National Defense and from 
other federal departments. Breen explains in his chapter on the Northeast how “Maine, Vermont, and Rhode Island 
maintained ‘an attitude of independence and self-satisfaction and occasionally even open hostility’ to the Washing-
ton office.” Massachusetts, too, “was always loath to reply to requests for information on its activities or to answer 
questionnaires” from the federal council. 
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made by those within the national council. Based on these reports, Breen says that Governor 
Hugh Dorsey, who in his role as state executive was also the chairman of the GCD, “kept a very 
tight rein on its activities” and “refused to permit the state council to act independently”; his “ac-
tions reflected the strength of the antiwar feeling in the state and his own political dependence on 
that group.”33 Breen concludes that “opposition to the war. . . . made the task of the southern 
state councils much more difficult and helps account for their limited achievements.”34 When 
looking at southern states, and specifically Georgia, from only federal records, it is easy to make 
such an assumption. True, war opposition was widespread, and southern councils’ achievements 
did fall far behind those from other areas of the country. But as I explore in chapter 3, the GCD 
records indicate a state council of defense that is more involved, with less influence from the 
governor, than Breen’s early study suggests.  
In addition to these nationally focused studies, there are some interesting works on local 
support and resistance, including Georgia Historical Quarterly articles by Milton R. Ready and 
Gerald E. Shenk. Ready’s 1968 article does an excellent job in chronicling how, and when, 
Georgia went from apathy toward war to full-scale support. He argues that in 1914 and 1915, the 
state was generally “unconcerned” about the affairs in Europe and “most Georgians looked to 
President Woodrow Wilson for direction.”35 Ready argues that Georgia’s changing attitudes after 
the advent of war stemmed from a collective guilt and a determination to show its patriotism af-
ter the trial and lynching of Leo Frank in 1915. These events stole a great deal of thunder from 
the Lusitania sinking in 1915 that gripped the rest of the country; Frank’s lynching drew national 
condemnation and threats by other states to boycott Georgia goods, as well as plenty of negative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid., 101. 
34 Ibid., 112. 
35 Milton R. Ready, “Georgia’s Entry into World War I,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 52 (September 1968): 257. 
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press about Georgia after the event.36 It is an intriguing theory that strives to explain the state’s 
support of the war; however, it is not fully supported by the newspaper accounts Ready heavily 
favors to back up his argument.  
More powerful in his argument is how the South collectively felt about the war and neu-
trality. Ready’s article discusses the impact of US senator Hoke Smith’s criticisms of Wilsonian 
neutrality, specifically the British blockade of Germany and the British seizure of southern cot-
ton: “In practice Smith determined that England’s constant seizure of American goods, especial-
ly cotton from Savannah, was more a violation of neutrality than the infrequent but spectacular 
sinkings of British ships with ‘rich Americans’ on board by German submarines.”37 (Historian 
Robert Tucker’ analysis of Wilson and neutrality, discussed earlier, supports Smith’s claims.) 
Much opposition to the war stemmed from these seizures as well as falling cotton prices, both of 
which were exploited by famed war opponent and Georgia populist icon Tom Watson.38 Yet 
Ready’s article clearly delineates a near-constant support for Wilson in Georgia newspapers. 
Wilson spent many of his formative childhood years in Georgia and was extremely popular both 
as a Democrat and an adopted Georgia son. Georgia’s loyalty to the president and its full faith in 
his abilities directed the change to war support, though one cannot completely discount Ready’s 
argument that the state wanted to redeem itself in the eyes of a critical nation. Still, in the matter 
of changing attitudes, it is more a story of how newspapers in the Solid South blew in whatever 
direction the political winds took the Wilson administration. This made newspaper editors and 
owners powerful and influential agents of coercion and compliance when US involvement in the 
war began.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., 260.  
37 Ibid., 258. 
38 Ibid. 
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Gerald Shenk, on the other hand, explores the draft in Georgia in terms of race, masculin-
ity, and labor requirements; his article provides a solid background on race and gender and how 
these issues painted the skin color of soldiers Georgia supplied to the US Army.39 The Georgia 
Council of Defense often responded to inquiries from other state councils about “Americaniza-
tion” efforts with the fact that less than 1 percent of Georgia’s population was foreign-born, 
therefore, Americanization efforts would have wasted time and resources.40 In this light, Shenk’s 
article reveals the local focus on race that seems to have superseded the national focus on anti-
Germanism—although local laws were passed in Atlanta and elsewhere with the intent of dimin-
ishing “pro-Germanism” and antiwar activities.  
Shenk’s research reveals an interesting aspect of war support: self-interest. He recounts 
tales of Georgia sheriffs and local draft boards conspiring with wealthy white planters to inten-
tionally delay delivery of draft notices to blacks so the sheriffs could round up the “slackers” and 
collect rewards from the army for delivering the supposed draft dodgers.41 In such cases, Shenk 
argues, the planters and local sheriffs, who otherwise opposed selective service and “eyed the 
draft with suspicion as a threat to local prerogatives,”42 were seen as complying but only “ac-
cording to their own convenience.”43 Financial reward may be a questionable rationale for patri-
otic support and, in this case, a morally corrupt one, but it is nonetheless another reason why 
some Georgians chose to support the war while others dissented (or were simply oblivious). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Gerald E. Shenk, “Race, Manhood, and Manpower: Mobilizing Rural Georgia for World War I,” Georgia Histori-
cal Quarterly 81 (fall 1997): 622–62. 
40 “Americanization” folders (total of three), Box RCB 56819, Georgia State Council of Defense Records 22-1-14 
(“Defense—Adjutant General—misc. WWI Records—1917–1918”), Georgia State Archives, Morrow, GA. Hereaf-
ter, the boxes in this group of records will be listed as RCB and the group of records abbreviated “GCD.” 
41 Shenk, “Race, Manhood, and Manpower,” 631–33. 
42 Ibid., 628. 
43 Ibid., 632. 
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Chapter Outline 
In the first chapter, I look at the realm of law and the spirit of vigilance in Georgia during 
the war. Within the abilities allowed by source availability, I analyze relevant laws and explore 
how these new federal (and in some cases, local) restrictions were violated (or perceived to be 
violated) by officials and the public. This chapter includes case studies to demonstrate the argu-
ments used to convict or persecute those accused of violating wartime laws. This chapter also 
attempts to trace the lineage of local laws, such as the aforementioned anti-German ordinance 
passed by the Atlanta City Council in April 1918. What, for instance, inspired this local law, and 
how did it differ from the Espionage Act passed in 1917 or the Sedition Act passed in May 
1918? Were local laws such as Atlanta’s an impetus for the new additions to the Espionage Act 
or a reaction to it? The laws and vigilance activities explored here demonstrate how coercion in-
formed actions that were supposed to be “voluntary.” 
Chapter 2 explores the Georgia newspaper press and its role in war support and how the 
press spun the events of the war and supported Wilson’s leadership. This chapter offers details 
on Georgia’s prewar opponents, specifically the reach and influence of Georgia’s US senators, 
Hoke Smith and Thomas Hardwick. The press especially demonized Hardwick, who never 
ceased in challenging the government’s infringement on personal liberties during the war. I in-
vestigate newspaper stories involving Hardwick to discover what editorial opinions as well as 
news accounts said about the opposition views of this public figure and his fellow senator, 
Smith, and how those articles helped to convince readers of the importance of war support and 
created a “Georgia” view of the war. (Georgia’s most famous war opponent was populist Tom 
Watson; however, Watson’s record on the war has been studied in great depth, so his influence is 
a minimal part of this study.)  
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The third chapter covers Georgia’s transition to a wartime stance and how it sought to 
adhere to federal requirements and laws once federal restrictions were put in place. The Georgia 
Council of Defense records at the state archive in Morrow, Georgia, are integral to this chapter, 
demonstrating specific organizations and drives to support federal actions (such as Liberty Loan 
promotions) and the overall war effort. These records have not been used as extensively as feder-
al records held by the National Archives. Though the GCD promoted the war in the face of some 
significant resistance, this chapter especially challenges previous studies in which scholars found 
the Georgia council to be weak and ineffective. I argue that GCD leaders, working within the 
main state agency in charge of implementing federal requests and disseminating information, 
actually took their roles very seriously. They sought creative ways to satisfy the federal govern-
ment while preserving independence, and they worked on a mostly voluntary basis, with limited 
resources amid a significant labor deficiency.   
The conclusion briefly looks at what these three areas of definitive war support say about 
Georgia in the First World War. In this final section, I address the overall atmosphere that suc-
ceeded the 1918 armistice in Georgia and what the end of the war meant for the state culturally 
and politically. As we will see, the predominant view of Georgia during the First World War as a 
realm of isolationism and antiwar sentiment is incomplete; coercion to support the war in a man-
ner that would seem voluntary and patriotic took root in Georgia as it did throughout the United 
States. The state and many of its citizens supported the war in various ways, and for various  
reasons—to abide by federal laws, to support a popular president, for economic imperatives, and 
even out of sheer patriotism.  
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CHAPTER 1: ENFORCING PATRIOTISM: LAWS AND CITIZEN VIGILANCE 
 
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any person to speak or write or circulate matters or 
printed articles attacking or ridiculing the issues of Bonds or Thrift Stamps by the United 
States of America in aid of the prosecution of the present war, upon the streets or public 
places of this city. 
—Excerpt from the Atlanta City Council’s anti-German ordinance, April 1918 
 
Though the later chapters in this thesis will focus on hitherto less explored elements of 
Georgia support for the war effort, I must state here that it would be misleading and false to infer 
that the state as a whole was behind Wilson and war 100 percent. War opposition, particularly 
among rural farmers, was strong. As mentioned in the introduction, Jeanette Keith’s Rich Man’s 
War, Poor Man’s Fight documents widespread southern resistance to the draft; Gerald E. 
Shenk’s research looks closely at the intent and effects of legislation passed locally to enforce 
draft adherence after Secretary of War Newton Baker issued the federal “Work or Fight” order in 
spring 1918, which in effect created a legal mandate requiring all sectors of civil and industrial 
life to mobilize in support of the war.  
Clearly, it is an established and well-researched fact that many Georgians opposed the 
war; opposition was compounded by the labor problems caused by the drafting of agricultural 
workers as well as the migration of southern blacks to urban areas in northern states where indus-
trial jobs beckoned. Yet war support was common throughout Georgia, too. It often manifested 
itself in local or regional laws that mirrored congressional legislation to enforce compliance with 
federal efforts or demonstrate Georgia’s patriotism. Such laws help explain how coercive legal 
measures influenced, or at least intended to influence, the popular support of the war. 
This chapter will explore how Georgia leaders responded to war dissent and the labor sit-
uation with legislation that targeted antiwar speech or activities and compelled “slackers” to  
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support the war and engage in war production or work of any kind. I will explore Work or Fight 
laws, by which cities and the state ultimately demonstrated the often subjective nature of law and 
how the law was used to reinforce white dominance in Georgia.1 I will also show how the Sedi-
tion Act debate circa April 1918 impressed municipal governments, and will conclude with a 
brief study of how vigilance activities—by run-of-the-mill civilians as well as the American  
Protective League—demonstrate a willingness by many Georgians to fall in step with the Wilson 
administration’s nationwide mobilization efforts. But first, in dealing with questions of laws, I 
will discuss the status of First Amendment rights and how Americans perceived the subject of 
civil liberties at the outbreak of US participation in the First World War. 
 
Free Speech and Civil Liberties in the First World War: An Overview 
During World War I, what many Americans now consider absolute rights of free speech 
and even free press were still relatively untested in federal courts and in the Supreme Court. The 
field of civil liberties was virtually a wide-open battlefield, at least at the federal level. Since the 
Supreme Court had not yet substantially engaged the subject of limits to these rights, once war 
began, the Wilson administration began a push to legislate these constitutional guarantees.  
Though newspapers by and large patriotically supported the Wilson administration, fed-
eral laws restricting free speech, and the war, the press vigorously fought Wilson on one key 
piece of legislation that the president wanted in the Espionage Act: a mandatory censorship 
clause, which one newspaper called a “campaign to shackle the press while the war is being 
fought, to rob it of the right guaranteed by the Constitution.”2 To the press’s delight, that provi-
sion was effectively defeated. The press had few if any qualms about the limits placed on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Shenk, “Race, Manhood, and Manpower,” 655. 
2 Editorial, Washington Herald, 24 May 1917, 1, quoted in Thomas A. Lawrence, “Eclipse of Liberty: Civil Liber-
ties in the United States During the First World War,” Wayne Law Review 21 (1974–1975): 41. 
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speech—protected by the same amendment that protects the free press—when the Sedition Act 
was passed in spring 1918. In Georgia, the Atlanta Constitution expressed the widespread senti-
ment that restrictions on free speech were acceptable:  
All traitors, all seditionists, all loose-tongued critics of the government’s war policies had 
best beware, because this bill [the Sedition Act] provides precisely the authority that is 
needed to clip their wings and hobble them. . . . It is just such a law as the country needs; 
and the need for it is made all the more apparent by the fact that it has been pending for a 
year, during which time its enactment has been blocked by the aforementioned “little 
group” in the senate. . . . The law will do much good, and it can do no injury to any man 
who speaks and acts the part of a thorough-going American citizen.3 
 
Many scholars have debated the status of American civil liberties in World War I. The 
Supreme Court developed its First Amendment jurisprudence after the First World War in re-
sponse to cases involving violation of the Espionage Act. Schenk v. United States (1919), for ex-
ample, established the famous “clear and present danger” aspect of limited free speech, in which 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that any definition of free speech would not protect some-
one who falsely shouted “fire!” in a crowded theater, thus causing a panic and a possible stam-
pede. In Debs v. United States (1919), the Supreme Court upheld American socialist leader Eu-
gene Debs’s conviction for violating the Espionage Act while giving a speech in Ohio. And in 
Abrams v. United States (1919), the court again upheld a conviction under the Espionage Act, 
only this time Holmes and Justice Louis Brandeis dissented in what Christopher Capozzola de-
scribes as an “epochal shift to the defense of free speech”; particularly, Holmes decided that the 
best defense of free speech was its credibility amid the “free trade of ideas . . . truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Punishing Sedition,” Atlanta Constitution, 7 May 1918, 8. 
4 Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919), quoted in Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 166. Capozzola also offers a 
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speech; see Uncle Sam Wants You, 164–67. 
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Thomas A. Lawrence notes that the Committee for Public Information published a War 
Cyclopedia in 1918 with common war terms and phrases explained to laymen. The book claimed 
Congress’s authority to pass “necessary and proper” laws in wartime meant the status of consti-
tutional freedoms during armed conflicts “rests, therefore, largely with the discretion of Con-
gress.’”5 Lawrence concludes, “This statement was sufficient to convince most readers, for the 
Supreme Court had considered few first amendment cases before World War I, and it may be 
assumed that very few Americans knew of or understood the Bill of Rights.”6 Paul Murphy 
agrees with Lawrence in his groundbreaking works on civil liberties. Free speech, Murphy 
claims, was “largely outside the area of . . . legal definition from the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights until World War I,” and Americans mostly considered it a tradition, “although it had few 
public guarantees. . . . Thus, freedom of speech was treated as a dearly won prize, but not used 
from day to day.”7  
Other scholars, however, such as Alexis Anderson, have revised the story of civil liberty 
development by emphasizing local and state legal developments from the period of Reconstruc-
tion until World War I, a time when, Anderson notes, “free speech ideals were first systematical-
ly repressed by arbitrary enforcement of municipal ordinances”8—such as the Bailey law against 
pro-Germanism in Atlanta (which will be discussed shortly). Anderson even cites an interesting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Lawrence, “Eclipse of Liberty,” 47. Though Lawrence is discussing the free press specifically in this section, his 
argument encompasses civil liberties and the Bill of Rights in general. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Paul Murphy quoted in Alexis J. Anderson, “The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870–1915,” 
American Journal of Legal History 24 (January 1980): 57. 
8 Anderson, “Formative Period of First Amendment Theory,” 58. Anderson’s study as a whole explores several state 
and federal appellate decisions concerning free speech cases prior to the First World War. Anderson particularly 
explores a complex evolution of cases that forbade “absolute prohibition of speech, [whereas] public order demand-
ed its reasonable regulation” (71). In addition to Anderson’s work, considerable literature exists on civil liberties 
development at the state level, and even at the federal level, before Reconstruction. See, for example, H. Robert 
Baker, The Rescue of Joshua Glover: A Fugitive Slave, the Constitution, and the Coming of the Civil War (Athens, 
OH: Ohio University Press, 2006); Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, “The People’s Darling Privilege”: Struggles 
for Freedom of Expression in American History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); and Sandra F. 
VanBurkleo, Belonging to the World: Women’s Rights and American Constitutional Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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free speech case in Atlanta in 1905, in which a socialist professor from South Carolina specifi-
cally set out to test an Atlanta ordinance. In a precirculated flyer, J. L. Fitts invited the public to 
come see what happened when he gave a public speech on socialism to challenge the Atlanta law 
prohibiting the “[lawful] assembling to discuss our condition and needs,” and asked citizens to 
“come . . . early and get a good place. Don’t block the sidewalk or streets.”9 The city accepted 
the challenge and shut Fitts down. The city court concluded the professor had “‘confused in his 
mind the constitutional right of freedom of speech with an imaginary, though non-existing right 
to hold public meetings and make speeches in the public streets.’”10 A mere thirteen years later, 
amid the crisis of world war, the federal government as well as state and local governments  
everywhere would be forced into another reckoning of “the constitutional right of freedom of 
speech.” This was as true in Georgia as anywhere. In Atlanta, for example, the city council 
would debate whether constitutional guarantees trumped the city’s own vested interests in sup-
porting the draft and Liberty Bond fundraising drives.  
 
Enforcing “Patriotic Fervor”: National and Local Laws 
Most any reckoning of civil liberties law during World War I begins with the passage of 
the Espionage Act in June 1917. At the federal level, Congress passed this act at the urging of 
President Wilson. While most historical references to the act tend to align it with a new martial 
spirit that pervaded the United States upon the declaration of war, the act was in fact conceived 
the previous year, when Wilson asked Attorney General Thomas Gregory to draft legislation 
against disloyalty. Congress received the draft in mid-1916; the Senate passed it before the dec-
laration of war, but the House did not take up the bill until after the official war declaration on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 49 S.E. 793, 795 (1905), quoted in Anderson, “Formative Period of First Amendment The-
ory,” 71. 
10 Ibid., 72. 
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6 April 1917.11 By the time active debate on the Espionage Act was over, both President Wilson 
and Attorney General Gregory felt the new law was too weak. As legal scholar Geoffrey R. 
Stone notes, the act was not intended by Congress to have the impact it did; it was intended to be 
limited:  
Congress took its constitutional responsibilities quite seriously and expressly rejected 
several key provisions proposed by the Wilson administration. . . . As the congressional 
debate suggests, the legislation, as enacted, was not a broadside attack on all criticism of 
the war. It was, rather, a carefully considered enactment designed to deal with specific 
military concerns. Although Congress’s stance in enacting the Espionage Act could hard-
ly be characterized as libertarian, its elimination of the press censorship provision (over 
the strong objections of the president) and its significant amendments to both the “disaf-
fection” and “nonmailability” provisions reflected a genuine concern for the potential 
impact of the legislation on the freedom of speech, or of the press.12  
 
That President Wilson and his attorney general would interpret the resulting legislation 
with wide latitude was to be expected. “As the war progressed, and the nation was whipped into 
a fever pitch of patriotism, the Wilson administration and the federal courts distorted the Espio-
nage Act in order to suppress a broad range of political dissent,”13 Stone writes. “Without firm 
precedent protecting the freedom of speech, few federal judges had either the inclination or the 
fortitude to withstand the mounting pressure for suppression. They, and the First Amendment, 
were swept away in a tide of patriotic fervor.”14 
The original Espionage Act’s impact mostly came down to the wording in section 3, 
which consisted of a mere 122 words:  
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports 
or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or 
naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terror-
ism (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 146; Murphy, World War I and the Origins of Civil Liberties,” 54–55. 
12 Stone, Perilous Times, 146, 152. 
13 Ibid., 146. 
14 Ibid., 160. For a thorough exploration of the courts’ interpretations of the Espionage Act, see Perilous Times, 
164–91. 
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when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordina-
tion, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United 
States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, 
to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.”15 
 
I do not discuss debate of the Espionage Act of 1917, because much of the act was writ-
ten and debated even before the US entered the war. But it is important to look at how the federal 
Sedition Act the following year, which amended the Espionage Act, was viewed in Georgia. For 
example, the city of Atlanta passed its own anti-German ordinance in April 1918. The debate on 
why the city needed such an ordinance is not found anywhere in city council minutes, but other 
resolutions passed by the council, even before the declaration of war, indicate a general and fer-
vent support of the US effort.16 Timing is an important clue to the law’s purpose; the city ordi-
nance passed roughly three weeks before the Congress passed repressive amendments to the Es-
pionage Act to create the Sedition Act. The Atlanta law clearly reflects locally the national de-
bate on the shortcomings of the Espionage Act and a need for more restrictive measures. It also 
reflected widespread state discontent—at least among newspapers and politicians—with US 
Senator Thomas Hardwick of Georgia, who was making national news in early April for his 
well-publicized and often rebuked opposition to the Sedition Act. (For more on Hardwick and 
his opposition to the Wilson administration, see chapter 2.) Strangely, the Atlanta Constitution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See appendix. 
16 Atlanta City Council Minutes 25, March 15, 1915, to June 21, 1917; Atlanta City Council Minutes 26, July 1917 
to May 1920, both at Atlanta History Center, Atlanta, GA. Examples include an 8 March 1917 resolution supporting 
Wilson’s demand for a cloture rule in the Senate after the infamous “little group of willful men” opposed Wilson’s 
endeavor for armed neutrality (vol. 25, 664); authorization for a leave of absence for city employees who wished to 
enlist, 16 April 1917 (vol. 25, 710); a resolution “heartily” supporting the Fuel Administration’s order restricting 
fuel consumption on Mondays in recognition of “the need of some inconvenience among our citizens in order to 
hasten the war to a speedy and victorious conclusion,” 21 January 1918 (vol. 26, 154); and a resolution in September 
1918 requesting the chief of police take down license numbers of cars driving on Sundays and turning them over, 
along with the names of drivers, to local papers for publication because “we condemn, as unpatriotic, the conduct of 
owners of cars operating same on Sunday contrary to the request of the government in order that gasoline be saved 
necessary war purposes” (vol. 26, 367). 
27 
 
 
reported almost solely on the national debate on the Sedition Act at this time; it quietly reported 
the passage of the local bill in mid-April.17 When Congress passed the Sedition Act, the Consti-
tution ran an editorial called “Punishing Sedition,” which outlined the new amendment’s sharper 
restrictions on publishing and speech and never mentioned the city’s own law passed the previ-
ous month.18 Clearly, the Atlanta law was symbolic. Still, it was used on at least one occasion to 
arrest a man who was later convicted and sentenced for violating the federal Espionage Act.  
The Atlanta ordinance was known as the Bailey anti-German law after the city council-
man who sponsored it. The ordinance prohibited “manifestations of pro-Germanism” and, in lan-
guage very similar to the Sedition Act (the text of which was currently publicized in news about 
the national debate, as the House had already passed the bill), made it illegal “for any person to 
speak or write or circulate matters or printed articles attacking or ridiculing the issues of Bonds 
or Thrift Stamps by the United States of America in aid o [sic] the prosecution of the present 
war, upon the streets or public places of this city.” 19 (Emphasis added.) (For a comparison of the 
language used in the June 1917 Espionage Act and that used in the May 1918 Sedition Act, see 
appendix.) The Atlanta law mimicked the original Espionage Act’s language that prohibited ac-
tions that might impact enlistment in the US armed forces; however, in anticipation of language 
used in the Sedition Act that Congress would pass the following month, the Bailey law also 
cracked down on those who criticized the armed forces, the government, or the president, and 
made it illegal to “give aid to the enemy by words or writing or printing or otherwise, in praising 
the work or progress or officers of the countries, with which our country is at war, or otherwise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Council to Investigate Power Company Petition Seeking Increased Rates,” Atlanta Constitution, 16 April 1918, 
1. The anti-German ordinance is mentioned briefly in the recap of the city council’s meeting on power company 
rates. 
18 “Punishing Sedition,” Atlanta Constitution. 
19 “An Ordinance . . . ,” City of Atlanta Ordinance Book 22, 84. 
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holding them up for approval, upon the streets or public places of the City.” 20 (Emphasis added.) 
The city law was remarkably lenient compared to the Espionage Act. The maximum fine for vio-
lating the new city law was $100 and/or a maximum of thirty days of community service (“work 
on the streets of the City”); the maximum penalty for violating the Espionage Act was $10,000 
and up to twenty years in prison.21  
How many times the Bailey law was cited or used to arrest slackers is unclear, but in  
August a 37-year-old cotton mill worker, Gilbert C. Carter, was arrested for “violating the Bailey 
anti-German law.”22 According to a witness and fellow tenant at the boarding house where 
Carter lived, Carter had said, “I hope the Stars and Stripes will be trampled under the feet of the 
Germans, and furthermore I don’t count myself an American citizen.” When arrested, Carter was 
held without bond pending a hearing. The complainant, a local firefighter, came too, and told 
police that if Carter hadn’t been sitting down when making the statement, the complainant 
“would have knocked him down.”23 If the complainant was truthful in Carter’s making the above 
statement, it is interesting for two reasons that when arrested, Carter told police “that as an 
American citizen he had the right to freedom of speech.” First, of course, Carter supposedly 
didn’t count himself a citizen, yet later claimed protection of his rights as a citizen. Second, 
when compared to citizens as described by scholars mentioned above—such as Lawrence, who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “An Ordinance . . . ,” City of Atlanta Ordinance Book no. 22; relevant passages from the federal Sedition Act, 
section 3, define violators of the federal law as those who, “when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, 
print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the 
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21 “An Ordinance . . . ,” City of Atlanta Ordinance Book no. 22. 
22 “Jailed on Charge of Hoping Germany will Defeat U.S.,” Atlanta Constitution, 4 August 1918, 8. 
23 Ibid. 
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surmised that “very few Americans knew of or understood the Bill of Rights”—Carter certainly 
seemed aware of a constitutional right to free speech, at least according to the Atlanta paper.24 
His interpretation of that right, however, predates the Supreme Court’s discussion of the right, 
which wasn’t readily acknowledged until long after the war was over. Perhaps this points to 
some public perception of speech rights that were independent of Supreme Court discussion. 
Carter’s prosecution was relatively swift, albeit in federal court under the Espionage Act 
rather than in Atlanta courts. He was in jail awaiting trial on the September 12 draft registration 
day; though prisoners were released to register, Carter declined to go, because he “‘just didn’t 
care to register.’”25 He was sentenced to two years in federal prison, on four counts of violating 
the Espionage Act as well as for evading the draft. In a somewhat comical look at the trial —and 
an intriguing one, as I could locate no surviving records of trial testimony itself—the Constitu-
tion reported that Carter considered himself “the reincarnation of George Washington” and was 
“standing by the principles of Washington,” whom he had read about and admired as a child.26 
On one hand, based on the Constitution’s brief summary of the trial, Carter seems a re-
markably observant and well-educated citizen for a “cotton mill worker and farmer”: Carter 
claimed he was not able to “sympathize with any nation or group of nations who believes in 
placing Germany or any other government in a similar position to the one that England had 
placed the United States at the time of the revolutionary war.” He claimed he would gladly fight 
for the country if it had been attacked by Germany “with the intention of placing her [the United 
States] under a yoke”; on the other hand, the article claimed Carter had read nothing about the 
war in newspapers, learning about the worldwide conflict “from a little girl in the cotton mills at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 
25 “Carter Will Make His Future Disloyal Remarks in Prison,” Atlanta Constitution, 23 October 1918, 9. 
26 “Saying He Is Washington, Reincarnated G. C. Carter Begins Term in Prison,” Atlanta Constitution, 24 October 
1918, 11. 
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Manchester.”27 The extent to which Carter truly felt he was Washington reincarnated is, unfortu-
nately, a mystery. The Constitution article is vague on the actual statement; the federal peniten-
tiary records contain warrants, indictments, sentences, and Carter’s eventual commutation of sen-
tence in March 1919 (reduced from two years to a year and a day), but no mention of anything 
remotely about the country’s first president.28 
The Sedition Act clearly had an influence on Georgia legislators. This Atlanta ordinance 
serves as one example of how local governments sought to support the Wilson administration 
and federal war activities with laws that either mimicked or reinforced legislation moving 
through Congress. Other federal actions spurred a more widespread response from Georgia and 
its municipalities, specifically the War Department’s “Work or Fight” order.  
 
Work or Fight: Enforcing Labor and Reining in “Slackers” 
“Work or Fight” became a patriotic slogan—and a means of implementing antiloafing 
laws, especially in the South—after the phrase was coined to describe the new edict by Secretary 
of War Newton Baker that went into effect 1 July 1918. Provost Marshal Enoch Crowder, who 
headed the selective service, was in charge if implementing the new rule, which specifically tar-
geted men of draft age.  
As with the Sedition Act, regional debates and Work or Fight ordinances reflected a 
broader national concern for local labor issues. Georgia, already bruised and battered by the 
Great Migration and the draft, began looking at a statewide Work or Fight–type act at least as 
early as April 1918, when the Georgia Council of Defense’s Labor Committee met in H. M. 
Stanley’s office (Stanley was Georgia’s Labor and Commerce commissioner) to consider “relief 
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28 Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, Inmate Case Files, 1902–1921, inmate no. 8926, Gilbert C. Carter, National Ar-
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of the acute labor shortage in the State.”29 Stanley explained the purpose of the meeting: “that 
some means be found whereby they [‘slackers, or idlers’] may be rounded up and put to work in 
industries where they are best capable of serving and where their labor is most needed” rather 
than arresting them to be put “on the rock pile as vagrants.”30 A substantial portion of the debate 
concerned enforcement of labor participation, particularly closure of pool rooms, which was a 
complicated endeavor because pool rooms paid a high and lucrative state tax on licenses. Sam 
Slate, the game and fish commissioner who would by the end of the year be the hard-nosed and 
combative secretary of the Georgia Council of Defense, was “just as much in favor of closing the 
pool room in the Country Club of which I am a member as I am of closing the negro dive in any 
of our cities. . . . [T]he principle involved as to personal rights does not justify making any ex-
emptions to the closing rule.”31 The commissioner of agriculture agreed, noting the extent to 
which Georgia farms were struggling, even abandoned, for lack of labor. “If the farmers are to 
suffer a decrease in income and production the pool rooms should be willing to do the same,” 
Slate said. “If they [pool rooms] are not willing to do it, unessential as they are to the welfare of 
the general public, then they should be made to do it.”  
The representative at the meeting from Augusta, Ross Copeland, suggested what would 
become the basis for the state legislature’s Work or Fight law. His city’s mayor had implemented 
a card system for laborers to prove they were gainfully employed, a system that Governor Hugh 
Dorsey urged the other members to back.32 Dorsey proposed to take up the matter of a similar 
state ordinance with the legislature; meanwhile, the committee approved the text of a work  
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31 Ibid., 4 of 12. 
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requirement ordinance to be disseminated to county councils of defense.33 Dorsey’s assessment 
of the legality of such ordinances is interesting. In response to Stanley’s concern that “some 
pressure” would be required by the state to motivate cities to act on the recommendation, Dorsey 
responded, “Of course if the [county and local] councils do not want to do it, I expect they have 
good grounds to defend their action because it may be unconstitutional; yet I think we ought to 
get it done and then let the courts decide as to the constitutionality of it.”34 (Emphasis added.) In 
Slate’s dismissal of “personal rights” and Dorsey’s willingness to act despite the “good grounds” 
of constitutional protest, we see the same debates locally that were brewing nationally over what 
civil rights meant. 
In addition to the work law in Augusta that was the source for the state law to come, the 
Atlanta City Council passed a municipal work ordinance on 20 May 1918, with basic wording 
almost identical to that suggested by the labor committee, demonstrating at least at the urban lev-
el a willingness to comply with state directives related to war labor.35 A city council alderman 
proposed extending this ordinance to women in October (after passage of the state’s Work or 
Fight law, discussed below), but the ordinance fell to defeat amid black opposition.36 The Atlanta 
Constitution reported on the November debate: “Several [blacks] gave as their opinion that such 
a measure as that under consideration would provoke ill feeling between the races and would 
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tend to scatter the colored people in other parts of the country.”37 H. H. Proctor, the black rever-
end at the First Congregational Church of Atlanta, urged, “The thing to do is to build up a spirit 
of morale through” local organizations where blacks could “be permanently influenced.” The 
reverend cited a recent example of such positive incentivism, in which the government ordered a 
large quantity of hard biscuits from a local producer, the Block Company; blacks responded 
positively so that no one could complain “that the colored people did not do their part to take 
care of the need.”38  
Proctor also opposed the state Work or Fight legislation in a letter to Governor Dorsey 
the previous July. He contacted Dorsey in response to an invitation to a state conference of black 
leaders on Negro organization.39 Proctor accepted the invitation but offered a caveat, suggesting 
“one of the matters which ought to be considered in this conference is the proper application of 
the ‘Work of Fight’ law. Already I find that the discussion of this bill has stirred up the colored 
people throughout the state, and unless it is handled with tact and liberality, it will have the op-
posite effect from which it is intended. Already large numbers of people are speaking of leaving 
Georgia.”40  Another response to the negro organization invitation, from the leader of the Col-
ored Men’s Board of the Atlanta YMCA, similarly noted “the work planed [sic] out for such a 
conference will be greatly interfered with should the ‘Work or Fight’ bill now pending before the 
legislature be passed and become effective. . . . [S]hould this bill become a law at least one third, 
if not one half of the present Negro population of Georgia, will flee to states where protection is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Woman Work Card Plan Is Defeated on Negroes Plea,” Atlanta Constitution, 9 November 1918, 5. 
38 Ibid. 
39 For more on Negro labor organization in Georgia, see Gerald Shenk, “Race, Manhood, and Manpower.” 
40 Letter from Henry H. Proctor to Hugh Dorsey, 28 July 1918, Negro Organization folder 1 of 2, RCB 56823, GCD.  
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afforded.”41 Still, the full extent of influence by black resistance to defeat this specific bill (to 
expand Work or Fight to include women, which would have generally affected black women) is 
difficult to gauge. The ordinance was defeated in the first week of November, when rumors of an 
imminent end to the war were circulating nationwide. (The armistice began on 11 November 
1918.) 
After the April meeting in the labor commissioner’s office, the statewide Work or Fight 
initiative made steady progress in the Georgia Assembly. The ultimate law was much more re-
strictive than the federal directive handed down by the secretary of war to be implemented by the 
selective service office. The legislature passed the law on 8 August 1918; Dorsey signed it short-
ly thereafter.42 The law’s final form followed a month and a half of debate in both houses of the 
assembly (bills were passed in both the senate and the house on the same day of the session, 26 
June).43  
As originally proposed, the law would “require all able-bodied male persons between the 
ages of eighteen and fifty years to be regularly and continually engaged in some lawful business 
or profession”;44 the final law had extended the age range from sixteen to fifty-five by the house 
(i.e., two years younger than the minimum draft registration age and ten years beyond draft age 
as these ages were extended for the third national registration in September 1918; prior to that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Letter from Young Men’s Christian Association to Hugh Dorsey, 24 July 1918, ibid. The signature is not fully 
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not certain. 
42 State of Georgia, “Work Required of Able-bodied Persons, Part I, Title IV, Civil and Penal Laws, No. 348,” 
Georgia Laws 1918 (Atlanta: Byrd Printing, State Printers, 1918), 279–82. 
43 Georgia General Assembly, Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia, Regular Session at Atlanta, Wednesday, 
June 26, 1918 (Atlanta: Index Printing, State Printers, 1918), 10; Georgia General Assembly, Journal of the House 
of Representatives of the State of Georgia at the Regular Session of the General Assembly at Atlanta, Wednesday, 
June 26, 1918 (Atlanta: Byrd Printing, State Printers, 1918), 9. Both titles available in the general reference section 
of the Georgia State Archives, Morrow, GA. 
44 Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia, 10. The initial wording of the house bill is similar: “A bill requiring 
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engaged in some lawful occupation”; see Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, 9. 
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registration, draft eligibility fell upon those twenty-one to thirty-one years of age); senate 
amendments extended the work period involved from five days to five and a half and replaced 
references to gender with “persons” or other nonspecific terms.45 The house insisted upon, and 
won, an exemption for those “fitting themselves to engage in trade or industrial pursuits” and for 
“bona fide students during the school term.”46 (The senate initially tried to squelch these exemp-
tions.47) The final bill required, as of 1 September, all unemployed men (though references to 
gender were eliminated in early drafts of the bill, the press understood that it applied mainly to 
men48) to register with the state labor commissioner, whose office was tasked with assigning 
work to those in need.49 
The Atlanta Constitution again fell into lockstep with the government’s priorities in a 27 
August editorial fully supporting the “progressive and timely” new state law, calling it a “demo-
cratic measure” akin to conscription.50 In response to a Sunday sermon by the leader of the Tab-
ernacle Baptist Church—in which the pastor claimed he could find at any given time in Atlanta 
2,000 “‘loafers pure and simple’” between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five—the paper declared, 
“if there is one such man to be found in Atlanta . . . the number is too great by one.” Further, the 
paper explained, farms and industries were hamstrung by labor deficiencies: “A part of the peo-
ple is striving at the rate of 100 per cent of endeavor, either fighting or working . . . while another 
part is not only doing nothing to help, but actually hindering by its idleness.” The editorial con-
cluded with an appeal to the supposed fairness of the act, saying it applied equally to “rich and 
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sons,” Georgia Laws, 1918, 281. 
47 Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia, 332–35. 
48 “Work or Fight Law in Effect on Sept. 1,” Atlanta Constitution, 25 August 1918, A6. 
49 “Work Required of Able-bodied Persons,” Georgia Laws, 1918, sec. 4 (p. 279) and sec. 7 (p. 280). 
50 Editorial, “The ‘Work or Fight’ Law,” Atlanta Constitution, 27 August 1918, 6. 
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poor alike, white and black. No one is exempted, and no one is favored; and, if properly en-
forced, no man can be done an injustice under it.”  
Walter F. White discussed Work or Fight laws in the South in a 1919 article in the New 
Republic. His article focused on how such laws in effect enforced labor participation in the face 
of labor shortages caused by the draft as well as black migration to the North; in many cases, the 
laws allowed employers to maintain wages at prewar levels as well as target blacks. White’s ex-
amples cover the South, but the majority come from Georgia, with local ordinances cited for 
Wrightsville, Bainbridge, Pelham, Macon, and Columbia County, as well as the state law.51 Most 
ordinances required citizens within a certain age group to carry cards signed by employers (not 
dissimilar to the “passes” required by blacks in pre-apartheid and apartheid-era South Africa). In 
Pelham, the article claimed, the town marshal—on orders from the county sheriff—informed a 
prominent black insurance salesman that selling insurance was not considered a valid job under 
wartime conditions (though Provost Marshal General Enoch Crowder’s national directive said 
otherwise), and the black man must look for more gainful employment. This news was delivered 
to the man while he was in the hospital with influenza; he died the next day.52 Another part-time 
salesman for the same insurance company, who also worked part time at Pelham’s fertilizer 
plant, was notified by the same town marshal that he must quit selling insurance and go back to 
work full time at the fertilizer plant.53  
In Bainbridge, an ordinance that attempted to force local black women to work (the facts 
of their husbands’ employment and their own roles as homemakers were not deemed suitable 
excuses for not working outside the home) was rendered toothless when local black citizens 
pledged to resist the ordinance “‘to the last drop of blood in their bodies’”; White notes that only 
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black women were singled out by this law, and “no record could be found of any able-bodied 
white woman being molested.”54 White noted that, at the time of his writing, an estimated 
“500,000 to 1,500,000 Negroes have gone North,” in what is now known as the Great  
Migration.55 
Georgia and its city governments used Work or Fight laws for multiple purposes. As 
Gerald Shenk argues (see my discussion of this in the introduction), sheriffs and draft boards of-
ten colluded to prevent men from receiving draft notices so a bounty could be collected on the 
supposed draft dodgers. Such questionable deeds still demonstrated a self-serving purpose in fol-
lowing the federal orders. Similarly, though coerced by federal directives, cities often chose to 
voluntarily pass their own Work or Fight laws to supplement or adapt the federal order or the 
state law to local conditions.  
 
“Without Reward, and with Abundant Zeal”: Vigilance in Georgia 
The Civil War may have turned brother against brother, but World War I turned many 
Americans against each other. The war ushered in an unprecedented level of suspicious and ac-
tive vigilance among Americans. Though World War I inarguably gave the word vigilance a 
dark and sinister hue, the act of “policing” neighbors and communities was nothing new to most 
Americans. Christopher Capozzola argues that by the time of country’s entry into the war, 
“Americans were accustomed to the idea that citizens had a positive obligation to police  
one another.”56  
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During the war, vigilance became intertwined with vigilantism in many parts of the coun-
try as wartime hysteria targeted those of German dissent or anyone perceived as foreign or not 
acting in an appropriately patriotic fashion. Therefore, it is important here to distinguish between 
the extreme acts that correspond to vigilantism, which are not a focus of this chapter, and the act 
of vigilance as a form of “political practice in which collective policing by private citizens con-
tributed to community defense.”57 While mob violence—vigilantism—has been a focus of World 
War I scholars for a very long time, Capozzola recaptures the impact of vigilance itself as a 
longstanding duty to Americans; in other words, the extensive citizen coercion of the World War 
I period in the United States wasn’t so much a sea change, but rather an extension of what proper 
Americans were already prepared to do.58  
Examples of community vigilance in action are found in the Quitman Free Press in South 
Georgia. In May 1918, the Quitman paper noted the existence of a “vigilance committee” within 
the county council of defense, whose purpose would be to “interest itself in who is who in regard 
to purchasing bonds, supporting the Red Cross and working with the community.”59 In June 
1918, the same paper ran an article by the chairman of the Brooks County council of defense, 
who sought to clear up rumors concerning two local citizens who failed to stand during the play-
ing of the national anthem while enjoying a film at the Quitman Opera House. One, Mr. N. M. 
Rosenbloom, “a naturalized Jew” who became a citizen in 1897, defended his actions with duti-
ful chagrin: “I love my country, which is America. . . . I think Mr. Woodroow [sic] Wilson is the 
greatest of all Americans and consequently the greatest man in the world.”60 Rosenbloom 
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acknowledged his mistake, saying he was engrossed in the film and lost in his own thoughts; af-
ter several moments of oblivion while those around him stood up, he realized the anthem was on 
and “stood immediately” (though clearly not fast enough to avoid notice from his vigilant fellow 
moviegoers). “No law is needed to make me patriotic,” the accused pleaded. “It comes from my 
heart. I have been greatly misunderstood in Quitman because I was a stranger and many thought 
I was an alien. . . . I understand this is a time when people are under a tense strain. I also realize 
strangers are under suspicion.” Rosenbloom thanked the council chairman for giving him the op-
portunity to fully express his patriotism through the local paper. 
The other gentleman, D. M. Martin, was “as loyal as an American can be,” according to 
the council chairman who wrote the story. Martin excused his own seeming lack of patriotic zeal 
by prefacing his defense with a commitment “to be put to the extreme test—that of dying for my 
country.” Martin said it was his first time seeing this patriotic film and was absorbed in “hating 
the Kaiser with all my heart and never dreamed I was sitting” when the anthem played. Once he 
realized it—a child behind him tapped him on the shoulder to alert him—he remained seated out 
of embarrassment, not “know[ing] what was expected of me.” His decision to remain seated 
hardly mattered; Rosenbloom had stood the moment he realized his error and was still reported 
by observant Quitman citizens to the local council for investigation.61 Neither ignorance nor tar-
diness was an excuse. 
This fear of dissent was tied very closely to foreign population influences. For example, 
in a 1919 account of vigilance efforts, the official chronicler of the American Protective League 
(APL) singled the South out as a unique geographic and demographic region, worthy of the 
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highest praise of its patriotism. Emerson Hough, author of The Web, wrote, “Had it not been for 
imported labor [in the South], the A. P. L. would have had no alien and sedition cases, no propa-
ganda and no disloyalty to report, because it is absolutely true that our Southern States, which 
once thought themselves constitutionally justified in secession, today are more loyal to the 
American flag man for man, town for town, state for state, than any or all the remaining states in 
this Union.”62 On southern demographics, Hough noted the South “holds more of the native born 
Americans, fewer of the foreign born, and fewer alien enemies” than in other regions; he ad-
mired this “pure-bred American population” and said with reverence, “Would God that every 
state in the North and West had these men as the real inheritors of America, and not the snarling 
mob of foreigners who in the last few decades have come to be called American citizens.”63 
The APL has a colorful, troubled, and sketchy history. One of the most important vigi-
lance groups during the war period in the United States, the APL fell under the authority of the 
Department of Justice. It was a secretive if not quite secret organization composed of civilian 
volunteers tasked with searching out disloyalty and suspected agents of sabotage. David M. 
Kennedy describes the group in Over Here as “a quasi-vigilante organization . . . which had 
managed to enter into an official relationship” with Attorney General Thomas Gregory’s Justice 
Department.64 At its peak at the end of the war, the APL boasted 250,000 members across the 
nation, all purportedly patriotic Americans whose duty it was to spy on their fellow citizens and 
report to the harried federal government on anyone making disloyal utterances or engaging in ill-
described suspicious activities. Despite widespread knowledge of the APL among historians, in-
dividual state histories are much more difficult to explore. The National Archives purged the 
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APL records in the 1950s, destroying all but certain samples of the files of New York, North 
Carolina, Arkansas, California, and Kansas. This is a tragic loss for historians, which has forced 
scholars, as Jeanette Keith suggests, to “infer the activities of the APL in the South from the 
purged North Carolina and Arkansas files.”65  
The absence of official federal records does not mean unofficial records do not exist, but 
such an exploration is beyond the scope of this thesis. Still, certain references to the APL may 
lead to further study. An exploration of the Atlanta Constitution’s digital database reveals, in an 
article about a 1919 city hall investigation of possible disloyalty by a former firefighter, the name 
of an individual, A. M. Schoen, who is identified as the leader of local underwriters in Atlanta 
and who offers as credentials in the investigation a badge that reads “Chief, American Protective 
League, Auxiliary.”66 This seems to identify Schoen as the local leader of the APL in Georgia, or 
at least Atlanta. Schoen’s name also appears in the Constitution in early 1918 as a Georgia 
Council of Defense speaker on increasing food production for the war effort.67 Schoen’s associa-
tion with this group hints that he was affiliated not only secretly with the APL but also publicly 
with the GCD. Little more is known about Schoen, but his title and mention in the city hall in-
vestigation indicate an active APL cell existed in Georgia during the war. 
What little else is known about Georgia’s place in the APL history comes from Hough’s 
The Web. His analysis of the state APL is brief, approximately one page of his book. (In compar-
ison to the other southern states, Georgia’s page of information is about average, though Ken-
tucky’s and Texas’s APL histories each run two and four pages, respectively; Oklahoma gets two 
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brief paragraphs.)68 Hough says “all sorts of stories” are found in the Georgia APL files, though 
only two specific examples are offered. The first is cryptic, “regarding submarine bases” on the 
Georgia coast, and involved “a naturalized German” who “was outspoken in his sympathy for” 
his homeland. The man bought some land and somehow this led to his arrest and trial in Savan-
nah’s city court for “violating the prohibition laws” of the state. Before he could even finish his 
six-month sentence, US marshals took custody of the man on a presidential warrant. Hough cited 
this anecdote as similar to “many and many a case of naturalized Germans who became too lo-
quacious in this country before and after we entered the war.”69 
The second Georgia example exemplifies the intrusive investigative techniques for which 
the APL is best known and is worth quoting at length: 
Atlanta, Georgia, had a nice scare about the report that a German U-boat captain had 
landed and was on his way to Atlanta, dressed in an American officer’s uniform. Opera-
tives were out and trailed every military or quasi-military looking man on the streets or 
anywhere else. Their first haul included a major from the Judge Advocate General’s of-
fice and a Judge from the Federal Court. The next alarm came from two operatives who 
trailed an officer just off the train, who turned out to be a colonel of the Quartermaster’s 
Corps, U. S. A. The latter was able to make his escape. The Chief [presumably of the 
Georgia or Atlanta chapter, which could be Schoen] adds: “Just how many suspects were 
held up that night it would be difficult to state. Operative No. 3 turned in a report of his 
activities the next morning. It seemed he had held up the following personnel: One Lieu-
tenant-Colonel, sixteen Majors, twenty-three Captains, forty-two Lieutenants, one Lieu-
tenant-Commander, three Ensigns, and seven Sergeants—a total of ninety-two suspects. 
He closed his report with the following heartfelt remarks: ‘Well, I didn’t know what kind 
of uniform the German had. Besides, every man I stopped was a blond. I didn’t stop any 
other sort.”’ D. J. [Department of Justice?] reported it was satisfied no German submarine 
officer had visited Atlanta.70 
 
Whatever “scare” or event this entry refers to is unknown. The Atlanta Constitution 
seems to have no record of any such search; how APL operatives knew about it is also unknown 
since records no longer exist. What can be discerned from this is encapsulated in Attorney  
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General Thomas Gregory’s preface to The Web: “The work of your organization will long be an 
inspiration to all citizens to render their full measure of service to their country according to her 
need, without reward, and with abundant zeal.”71 If other Georgia operatives were even half as 
zealous as no. 3—who detained 92 US service personnel in a single night to root out a German 
spy who was never caught, and perhaps never existed—it speaks to the patriotism of APL mem-
bers and their determination to root out those who did not support the war effort.  
Georgia was far from lax in supporting the war, whether we examine its state government 
or municipalities in action. In fact, while debates raged in Washington, DC, on strengthening the 
Espionage Act and creating a law to force those who weren’t drafted to support the war through 
labor, Georgians in government took it upon themselves to create their own laws, whether to ad-
dress a deficiency or to strengthen a federal mandate. Though such support was sometimes more 
self-serving—as in the case of the state Work of Fight law in response to labor shortages—rather 
than blindly patriotic, such voluntary actions were taken amid a coercive atmosphere that perme-
ated the country as a whole. Many Georgians opposed the war, but many—at the government 
level and at the citizen level, too—went to special efforts to support the nation’s war efforts. In 
the next chapter I turn to the coercive influence of newspapers upon the minds of Georgians, and 
how press coverage helped create and even enforce patriotic support of America’s war overseas. 
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CHAPTER 2: “PATRIOTS OR TRAITORS”:  
THE GEORGIA PRESS AND THE WAR CRISIS 
 
Free Speech! How many treasonable utterances are made in thy name! 
—Thomasville Times-Enterprise, 30 August 1917 
 
When Woodrow Wilson addressed the special session of Congress on 2 April 1917, to 
ask for a declaration of war against Germany, he faced an organizational dilemma. Reelected by 
a slim margin the previous November as the president who “kept us out of the war,” it was in-
cumbent upon Wilson and his administration to prove to the American people why, after 30 
months of war, the United States must enter the fight. In this address, Wilson laid out his indict-
ment of German crimes against the nation and famously declared the US mission in the war was 
“to make the world safe for democracy.” As the United States shifted toward imminent war, 
Georgia, like other southern states, faced the task of mobilizing a citizenry that heretofore had 
opposed American intervention in the European war. This chapter will discuss the important role 
played by Georgia’s local presses in helping the United States government broadcast a hawkish 
mood to the masses and sell the war to a public that until quite recently had really wanted to stay 
out of it.  
In the introduction, I looked at the political atmosphere in the country at various times 
during the two and half years (August 1914 to April 1917) the United States struggled with neu-
trality. In this chapter, I will show how war hysteria played out over the summer of 1917 as the 
state and the nation attacked “antiwar” advocates such as Georgia’s own US Senator Thomas 
Hardwick. I will then compare the coverage of Hardwick’s war opposition through several pa-
pers, including the Atlanta Constitution, the Atlanta Independent (a black newspaper and the  
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official record of the Georgia Odd Fellows association), and two rural Georgia papers, the  
Thomasville Times-Enterprise and the Americus Times-Recorder. 
The power of newspapers to generate public opinion in this era cannot be dismissed. Ra-
dio was in its infancy and still a tool of military application rather than a medium of entertain-
ment and edification; television was decades away. Only newsreels at the local movie house, 
played before a main feature and later augmented by propaganda speeches from America’s vol-
unteer Four Minute Men, offered a supplemental avenue for news and opinion. And in all cases, 
the dominant message coming across to readers and moviegoers was that anyone who opposed 
the war in any way was helping the Kaiser and putting American troops in danger.  
  
Georgia Papers Back Wilson 
Even before the declaration of war on 6 April, Congress in March had fought for, and the 
public endorsed, the arming of US merchant vessels against Germany’s renewed campaign of 
unrestricted submarine warfare. Wilson’s campaign for “armed neutrality” hit a significant road-
block, however, in the Congressional debate when several antiwar senators filibustered the 
measure, effectively killing it.1 Senator Thomas Hardwick, the junior senator from Georgia, and 
senior Senator Hoke Smith both signed a Senate manifesto, along with 74 other senators, pro-
claiming their support for the armed neutrality measure, their intention to vote for it if it had been 
allowed on the floor, and condemning the filibusters of what Wilson had called a “little group of 
willful men.”2 The Georgia senators were counted by the Atlanta Constitution in a March 5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 After the defeat of the measure in Congress, Wilson declared an executive order to arm the merchant vessels any-
way. However, before armed neutrality could be fully implemented, the Unites States declared war on Germany in 
early April. For a discussion on Wilson’s motives in wanting armed neutrality as a steppingstone toward war, see 
Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 200. 
2 “Armed Neutrality Killed by Filibusters: Twelve Senators Defied the Wishes of 76 Colleagues and Blocked Vote,” 
Atlanta Constitution, 5 March 1917, 1. 
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article on the measure under a subheading that denoted “Senators Who Stood for American 
Rights.”3 This was to be one of the last times Smith and Hardwick would be called supporters of 
American rights, by the Constitution, Georgia newspapers, or the national press.  
Other areas of the state demonstrated similar support for the president’s policies. On 6 
April, the day Congress voted for war, Hoke Smith placed in the congressional record the prowar 
resolution of University of Georgia faculty and students. The resolution cited “the institution’s 
record of love for peace” but declared that “freedom, truth, and justice” mattered more; the 
school offered “loyal, patriotic, and unstinted service” toward the war effort—including ac-
ceptance of compulsory and universal military service and a vow to stand behind any other steps 
the administration saw fit to implement.4 The Constitution noted the entry in the House record of 
the resolution of the city of Newnan supporting the defense of American rights and the offer by 
the editor of the West Point News newspaper to support the nation any way he could.5 In  
Americus (in west central Georgia), the town’s weekly Times-Recorder sent to its readers on 5 
April “the urgent and insistent request” that patriotic Americans back the president and his ad-
ministration in the imminent war against Germany “in defense of American rights.”6 Two weeks 
later, the Times-Recorder weighed in on the side of “universal selective conscription,” beseech-
ing Congress to adopt the draft and “provide the means of right, forsaking the proven failure of 
the volunteer system.”7 The draft would prove to be very unpopular in rural Georgia to those 
who actually had to register and muster, but in Americus and other Georgia towns, those with 
influence in the press strongly promoted the concept of sacrifice and duty. When war was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid. 
4 “U. of G. Resolution in Congress Record.” Atlanta Constitution, 7 April 1917, 11. 
5 Ibid. 
6 “A State of War,” Americus Weekly Times-Recorder, 5 April 1917, 2. Presented online by the Digital Library of 
Georgia. 
7 Untitled editorial in column 2, Americus Weekly Times-Recorder, 19 April 1917, 2. Presented online by the Digital 
Library of Georgia. 
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declared, other papers throughout the state offered their unflagging support for the nation and 
for Wilson. 
The African American community supported the war, too, seeing the war from a unique 
perspective and with some unique reservations. For example, the Atlanta Independent, a black 
weekly newspaper published by the Georgia chapter of the Grand United Order of Odd Fellows 
and which focused on local news of interest to the black community, unreservedly supported the 
United States’ entry into the war in its 7 April issue. The Independent addressed rumors that 
Germans were courting blacks in the American South to rise up against white oppressors and 
foment discord from within. The paper dismissed such rumors as unfounded, but did 
acknowledge the discrepancies in southern law and society that might cause blacks to feel such 
animosity as to consider rebellion. “The American Negro is oppressed, discriminated and pro-
scribed against,” the editorial said, “segregated, Jim Crowed and outlawed by many of the states 
of which we are citizens; but these are family affairs; these are affairs that we live and pray may 
adjust themselves in America, by Americans and for Americans.” In the throes of conflict with a 
foreign country, it continued, Americans were colorblind: “[W]e forget our domestic troubles 
and lose ourselves in one patriotic endeavor to protect American life and interest; we forget that 
we are Negroes; we forget that we are white, and only realize that we are Americans first, Amer-
icans last, and tolerate no divided allegiance.”8 Another editorial in that same issue, however, 
offered a harsher indictment of Wilson’s endeavor to make the world “safe for democracy.” Af-
ter printing Wilson’s war message to Congress at length, the Independent wrote: “[W]e could not 
help from thinking that very much of the way in which President Wilson pointed out the manner 
in which German people were treated by the German government, Negro people are treated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “America First and Efficient,” Atlanta Independent, 7 April 1917, 4. Available on Google News Archive. 
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this country. . . . If the American people who are so anxious about popular government for other 
people were as solicitous about ten million black people at home, their words would mean a 
great deal more.”9 The following week, the Independent expounded on its stance, seemingly in 
response to an actual or rhetorical question: Why should southern blacks support the war? “No 
one knows better than the Independent that we have much of which to complain; that we have 
not had a square deal; that our rights have been abridged; that we have had to play second fiddle, 
yet, as patriots, as true lovers of our country, let us present a solid front against the common en-
emy. Let us forget our grievances and the mistreatment, and only think of how to uphold the 
honor and dignity of this great and glorious country of which we are a part.”10  
The Independent’s stance, in April 1917, is remarkably prescient in its language to the 
better known (and more controversial) words of W. E. B. Dubois and his “Close Ranks” com-
ments of summer 1918: “We of the colored race have no ordinary interest in the outcome. . . . 
Let us not hesitate. Let us, while this war lasts, forget our special grievances and close ranks with 
our white fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy. We make no or-
dinary sacrifice, but we make it gladly and willingly with our eyes lifted to the hills.”11 In both 
cases and in both years, they were words of hope that bore no fruit once the fighting was over 
and black soldiers returned to the United States.12 
In this atmosphere of almost unreserved political and public support for war—even by 
groups with serious grievances against the government—Georgia’s Democratic senators soon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Popular Government, Spirit of the Age,” Atlanta Independent, 7 April 1917, 4. Available on Google News Ar-
chive. 
10 “The Negro a True Patriot,” Atlanta Independent, 14 April 1917, 4. Available on Google News Archive. 
11 W. E. B. Dubois, in Mark Ellis, “‘Closing Ranks’ and ‘Seeking Honors’: W. E. B. Dubois in World War I,”  
Journal of American History 79 no. 1 (June 1992), 99. Ellis notes that Dubois’s editorial, “Close Ranks,” was seen 
by many blacks at the time as a betrayal of the civil rights cause. 
12 During the rest of the time studied for this paper, through July 1917, the Independent had very little to say in re-
gard to the war and no comment on the ensuing controversy over Georgia’s US senators. It instead concerned itself 
with local Atlanta news, such as the Fourth Ward fire in May, Odd Fellow news, and the flight of black laborers to 
the North in what later became known as the Great Migration. 
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found themselves on the losing side of public opinion. Hardwick was particularly vulnerable. He 
had earned the position as senator in a special election after his predecessor, Augustus Bacon, 
died in office in 1914. The White House had, in fact, supported Hardwick as the candidate to re-
place Bacon; Hardwick in turn had declared himself the president’s man, “a Senator who can be 
depended upon to stand by that great Democrat in the White House, Woodrow Wilson.”13 Even 
in January 1917, four days before Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare against 
neutral vessels bound for England and France—the event that prompted the United States’ sever-
ing of diplomatic ties with Germany and the eventual entry into the war—Hardwick said in a 
speech that Wilson had only Americans’ best interests in mind without thought for political par-
ties, and so far had weathered domestic and international conflicts with “peace and honor,” mak-
ing “him equal to every problem that has so far confronted the administration.”14  
The first signs of a disconnection with the public emerged in April during the debate on 
the Selective Service Act. Though the Constitution reported on 7 April that Smith and Hardwick 
both supported selective conscription and only the House seemed willing to fight for an all-
volunteer army, by the end of the month Hardwick emerged as one of the staunchest opponents 
of conscription.15 On 27 April, the Atlanta paper reported Hardwick had decided to oppose the 
bill in the Senate on the grounds that the bill was undemocratic and misleading to those who 
thought they would be exempt from conscription.16 Two days later the draft bill passed Congress, 
passing the Senate by 81 to 8 and the House by 397 to 24. Hardwick was one of the eight who 
voted against conscription.17 He addressed the Senate, stating his support for the war only insofar 
as it was intended to punish Germany for its crimes against the United States. He opposed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Senate Races in 33 States,” New York Times, 14 July 1918, section 3, 1. 
14 “Wilson Is Extolled by Senator Hardwick,” Atlanta Constitution, 27 January 1917, 5. 
15 “Ga. Congressmen Object to Draft,” Atlanta Constitution, 7 April 1917, 1. 
16 “Hardwick to Oppose Administration Bill,” Atlanta Constitution, 27 April 1917, 2. 
17 “Country Goes Under Conscription,” Atlanta Constitution, 29 April 1917, 1. 
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alliances with the Allies, as well as Wilson’s already clear postwar plan to put the United States 
at the head of the peace table. The conscription act, he said, reeked of “Prussianism” and “would 
be a reversal of the policy this country followed since the days of Washington.”18 
Local presses were mostly reserved in their criticism of the Georgia senators for most of 
May and June as Hardwick, and to a much lesser degree Smith, continued to oppose the Wilson 
administration’s war footing. Most commentary on the senators was reserved for the first column 
of editorial pages, which in many papers was reserved for choice quotes from other newspapers’ 
editorials and snarky or witty comments about events or people (these often lacked context with-
out a presupposed knowledge of the subject). But hints of public dissatisfaction with the national 
politicians emerged here and there. In May the Americus Weekly Times-Recorder ran a blurb 
from the Swainsboro Forest-Blade, concerning a photograph Hoke Smith submitted of himself 
standing near Wilson at the president’s recent inauguration. The Forest-Blade quipped that “a 
more interesting edition [sic] to our art gallery, however, would be a picture of Tom Hardwick, 
also ‘standing by the president.’”19  
By July, however, after the passage of the Espionage Act in June and the postponement 
of the vote on the pending food administration bill, Hardwick—and by association and default, 
Smith—were becoming Georgia Enemies no. 1 and 2. Hardwick opposed the Food Control Bill, 
primarily an amendment in it giving the president power to decide the terms of a war tax on 
foodstuffs, which would rob Congress of its constitutional mandate to control the federal purse 
strings. Hardwick would not condone passing a bill “delegating to another the power that has 
been confided to [Congress], . . . the power to levy taxes, a power . . . Americans have fought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Georgians Split on Conscription,” Atlanta Constitution, 29 April 1917, 2. 
19 “Standing By,” Americus Weekly Times-Recorder, 10 May 1917, 2. Presented online by the Digital Library of 
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and bled and died [for] before they would submit to have it exercised by anyone else than the 
directly chosen representatives of the people themselves.”20  
 
July’s Verbal Fireworks 
The Fourth of July was a turning point in the war debate in Georgia as two speeches—
one by Hardwick in Columbus, the other by a prowar advocate in Athens—captivated readers 
throughout the state. July was a busy month in general for war news. The political combat waged 
through Georgia newspaper editorials that month occurred amid the backdrop of several high-
profile events, including the first draft lottery of men who had registered for the selective service 
in June. July was also a busy month for Georgia’s Populist agrihero Tom Watson, whose influ-
ence in the press debate expanded in August, which I explore below in greater detail. In June 
Watson was busy pursuing his court opposition to the Selective Service Act and was actively 
fighting the banning of his weekly publication, the Jeffersonian, which two southern postmasters 
refused to deliver for disseminating antiwar views.21  
On 4 July Hardwick was back in Georgia for the patriotic holiday and gave a speech at 
the Chamber of Commerce in Columbus, detailing his stance on and even his support for the war 
thus far. He approved punishing Germany for crimes against the United States, and though he 
opposed the shedding of blood by draftees, he supported sending “professional soldiers.” He 
stood firm in the attitude he had taken since passage of the Selective Service Act, telling the au-
dience he still disagreed with conscription, but since it was law, it should not be resisted. “If this 
be treason, make the most of it,” he said to the mostly silent but generally courteous crowd. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “Hardwick Fights Control of Food,” Atlanta Constitution, 2 July 1917, 6. 
21 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 152–54. The papers were banned in Savannah and Tampa in June. Throughout 
July Watson belligerently pled his case, only to have Postmaster General Albert Burleson confirm the banning in 
August. Three days after Burleson’s ruling, a federal judge also affirmed the banning. Watson attempted to continue 
publishing but gave up in September. 
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Hardwick called Wilson “a great man” but tempered his praise by reminding the audience the 
president was “mortal and makes mistakes, even as I make them.” It was a mea culpa the news-
papers would later exploit in their attacks against Hardwick. The senator also dramatically stood 
his ground on his right to oppose the president: “I shall not bow the knee, I shall not take orders 
from any man or set of men, but shall do my duty as God gives me the opportunity to see the 
light.”22  
Meanwhile, across the state in Athens, Judge Andrew J. Cobb gave a rousing and popular 
Fourth of July speech that resounded throughout Georgia for weeks to come. Cobb whipped up 
the patriotic crowd of 8,000 when he said, “In times of war there are only two classes. All men 
are either patriots or traitors. If a man lets one particle of disloyalty enter his soul, he is a traitor 
as a whole. . . . [I]n time of war, no man should be allowed to raise his voice or his pen against 
the government.”23 Interestingly, Cobb expended most of his invective on Senator Hoke Smith, 
who, unlike Hardwick, previously had escaped a great deal of notice since Smith’s opposition 
measures in Congress were in almost all cases followed by his vote for the war legislation. The 
eventual vote was not a valid excuse for Judge Cobb. He invoked the recent commencement ad-
dress given by Smith to University of Georgia graduates and pronounced, “We are tired of delay 
in the halls of congress on these war measures. . . . If a congressman cannot support the govern-
ment and the people in this war let him resign and come home. . . . When we find a man who 
cannot support Woodrow Wilson, let us send him to Germany to his friends.”24 
Both speeches defined patriotism in polar opposite terms, and both created a furor in the 
Georgia press. The Macon Telegraph leaped on Hardwick’s war record and the Columbus 
speech. Calling the speech “ill-timed, un-called-for and useless,” the Telegraph labeled  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “Hardwick Flays Administration for War Plans,” Atlanta Constitution, 5 July 1917, 1. 
23 “Judge A. J. Cobb Nails Members of Congress Who Delay War Bills,” Atlanta Constitution, 5 July 1917, 1. 
24 Ibid. 
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Hardwick a “copperhead,” a reference to the group of antiwar Northern Democrats in the Civil 
War that had wanted immediate peace with the Confederacy.25 Hardwick’s hometown paper, the 
Thomasville Times-Enterprise, weighed in against the senator on 7 July, stating that any opposi-
tion to the US war effort harmed America’s chances to win the war. Hardwick had explained 
himself in his Independence Day speech, the paper wrote, and “has cemented . . . opposition into 
still further efforts to discount laws made and in the making. In that respect it has done great in-
jury in Georgia to the great cause we have espoused.”26 Ironically, Hardwick’s speech had spe-
cifically indicated his current support for the draft law because it had become the law of the land.  
A week after the holiday, the Americus Times-Recorder claimed Cobb’s speech “brought 
about a crystallization of sentiment” throughout the state and the region that would unite people 
“against the insidious attacks of demagogues whose anarchistic utterances border close on  
treason.”27 The same edition called the junior senator “Thomas Hohenzollern Hardwick.” (“Herr 
Hardwick” and “Thomas Wilhelm Hardwick” were other German-themed monikers that surfaced 
frequently in attacks on the senator; for examples, see note 41.) Under a separate editorial titled 
“A Political Corpse,” the paper reluctantly defended Hardwick’s dogged fight to the finish, only 
to conclude that such a finish would be a “bitter end” and a reelection defeat in 1918: “His hold 
on the people of Georgia is forever broken; their support has been forever alienated by the 
treacherous, vindictive attacks made by him upon the government to which he should lend every 
ounce of his support in this period of national stress.”28 
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Hardwick retaliated on 8 July with a harshly worded open letter to the papers in which he 
defended his speech and accused editors across the state of intentional misrepresentation. “Cer-
tain of the cuckoo newspapers in Georgia and certain other people who are either misinformed or 
who put their desire for local encampment and other like pap above everything else have burst 
into a preconcerted and prearranged howl of criticism leveled at me,” Hardwick claimed. He re-
iterated his opposition to conscription but said he supported the draft law because it was, indeed, 
the law; still, he believed the United States could defend its own interests without becoming em-
broiled in Europe’s affairs. “If this is treason,” Hardwick challenged, “then I stand branded trai-
tor along with George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew 
Jackson and almost every other statesman of any weight or consequence in this country until the 
advent of these latter-day prophets.”29 Hardwick then dismissed the Macon Telegraph’s criti-
cisms specifically, labeling its editor (George Long) “an alien and unnaturalized foreigner,” with 
“neither the right to vote nor the duty to fight.”30  
Judge Cobb’s incendiary Fourth of July speech put Hoke Smith’s feet to the fire of public 
opinion even as it solidified editorial opposition to Hardwick. Even as early as June, Smith was 
defending his voting record, mainly for forcing debate on the food bill (and other administration 
measures) rather than offering blind support. Congress, Smith maintained—against a growing 
sea of believers that felt anyone in Congress not fully and immediately supporting the president 
was aiding the enemy—was only prolonging the legislative debate to make laws “safe and 
strong” before enactment, not to stall war efforts.31 The Savannah Evening Press chided Smith 
for apparently believing “that delay itself exercises some magic power to strengthen and make 
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30 Ibid. 
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safe”32—a somewhat non sequitur argument that dismissed Smith’s claim that delay was for leg-
islative debate that did, indeed, make for better law. (Newspapers, the Savannah Evening Press 
included, surely had no qualms about the extended debate in June that kept a mandatory press 
censorship clause, strongly desired by President Wilson, out of the Espionage Act.) The Savan-
nah paper is but one example of the impatience exuded by communities and presses throughout 
Georgia to get the war up and running, even to the extent of distrusting fellow Georgians in favor 
of blind faith in the clearly idolized president.  
The Georgia Historical Society (GHS) published its own indictment of Georgia’s sena-
tors in newspapers in mid-July, accusing both senators of “failing to reflect [Georgia’s] senti-
ments” and warning them “to change their attitude toward the government and mould [sic] their 
conduct in accordance with the wishes of the people of whom they are presumably the mouth-
piece.”33 The Atlanta Constitution, citing the supposed nonpartisanship of the GHS as well as the 
vitriol coming from papers all over the state, bemoaned Georgia’s lack of a recall vote: “Not a 
single newspaper of Georgia has raised its voice in defense of the two senators, or either of them, 
under attack. . . . [I]t is high time that our senators should heed the epigrammatic counsel of 
Murphy Candler [chairman of Georgia’s railroad commission], and either ‘Get right, or  
get out!’”34 
Only an exhaustive search of every Georgia newspaper could confirm this claim that no 
paper stood at the defense of either senator, but there is no doubt that the voices against the sena-
tors was a unified chorus. Toward the end of July, the Georgia Weekly Press Association gath-
ered in Thomasville for its yearly convention. Among the business accomplished by the GWPA 
was a “unanimous indorsement [sic] of President Wilson and its pledge to support him in every 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid. 
33 “Get Right—Or Get Out!” Atlanta Constitution, 22 July 1917, D4. 
34 Ibid.  
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way possible to the end that the war may be pressed to a victorious and speedy conclusion.”35 An 
Atlanta Constitution editorial on 26 July notes that Wilson responded to the GWPA’s message of 
support with gratitude and a “stern, but sad . . . lament that ‘without its assistance he would not 
have known how to interpret the attitude of Georgia!’”36  
Smith waged an impassioned counterattack against the Georgia Historical Society for dis-
regarding his voting record and not differentiating between himself and Thomas Hardwick. 
Smith published a rebuttal to the GHS’s accusations that spelled out the issues he opposed in the 
war bills—for example, he opposed the Food Control Act because it would have, among other 
things, established price maximums for cotton, an opposition Georgia cotton farmers must surely 
have appreciated. He also reiterated that his record of supporting the final war bills, in whatever 
shape they were in, was 100 percent. Any “opposition,” he maintained yet again, was merely his 
effort to “perfect” the legislation before it became the law. Incidentally, Smith made no attempts 
to address the GHS complaint against Hardwick. In conclusion, the senior senator addressed the 
historical society directly: “You are officers of the Georgia Historical association. I cannot be-
lieve that as historians you would be guilty of such misrepresentation of the facts had you been 
familiar with them, and yet, your ignorance upon the subject is surprising.” Smith requested that 
his letter be disseminated to all the same recipients the GHS’s original letter of condemnation 
had been sent to.37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Untitled editorial, Thomasville Times-Enterprise, 31 July 1917, 4. Presented online by the Digital Library of 
Georgia. 
36 “Is Another Recall Ahead?” Atlanta Constitution, 26 July 1917, 6. A dedicated search of these and other Georgia 
newspapers turned up no evidence of newspaper opposition to the president.  
37 “Senator Smith Makes Charge of Injustice,” Atlanta Constitution, 24 July 1917, 5. 
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Interestingly, Hardwick’s hometown paper in Thomasville actually accepted Smith’s de-
fense, at least this one time, but generally Smith’s denials fell upon deaf ears.38 The GHS presi-
dent, Lucian L. Knight, laughed off Smith’s defense. “The support which you have given to 
President Wilson has been soured by reluctance, and you cannot pass for cream what has turned 
to clabber,” Knight wrote in a lengthy response that gave no quarter to Smith’s argument. Knight 
stood by the GHS’s previous statement. Virtually washing his hands of any culpability for at-
tacking Smith’s record, he added, “If we have done you any injustice, let us hear from the  
president.”39  
This accusatory back and forth made headlines outside of Georgia, too. On 26 July the 
New York Times ran an editorial on the GHS controversy. Throughout the war, the Times was 
vehemently prowar and antislacker, and its attitude—as well as, in this case, an occasional pen-
chant for putting orthodoxy ahead of facts in its editorials—is evident in this early editorial. Re-
capping the discourse already noted above, the Times accused Smith of “persistent subordination 
of American rights to cotton.” After quoting Hardwick’s statement that Hardwick himself was 
“not willing to shed a single drop of American blood to determine what the boundary line of any 
European nation shall be”—a quote prudently plucked from its context—the Times added, “This 
is substantially Mr. Smith’s defense also.” Smith’s congressional prowar voting record notwith-
standing, the Times presented no evidence to support its assertion that Smith opposed war, on 
any terms. But the paper lauds the GHS for its “strong language from a dignified nonpartisan so-
ciety” and concludes that with the GHS and the Atlanta Constitution holding the senators’ feet to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “Hoke Smith for Food Bill, Hardwick Against,” Thomasville Times-Enterprise, 24 July 1917, 6. Presented online 
by the Digital Library of Georgia. The paper wrote, “It begins to look . . . as if the two senators from Georgia are not 
absolutely harmonious in opposing the war measures of the Wilson administration as some commentators have been 
endeavoring recently to show.” Smith voted for the food bill and the aviation bill, while Hardwick voted against 
both. On the aviation bill, Hardwick opposed the provision that allowed men registered for the draft to be assigned 
to the air service for support (i.e., nonflight) roles.  
39 “Knight, in Reply to Senator Smith, Puts Him and Hardwick in Same Boat in Blocking the Administration,” At-
lanta Constitution, 25 July 1917, 6. 
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the flame, “Georgia has vindicated herself,” insinuating Hardwick and Smith were friendless and 
on the road to their eventual political doom.40 
These examples come mostly from only four newspapers. Still, newspapers everywhere 
commonly ran condensed editorial comments from other papers, and a reading of these selec-
tions expands the view of support for Wilson and condemnation for Hardwick and Smith. The 
Macon Telegraph (noted above as a prominent thorn in Hardwick’s side, particularly) listed on a 
single day the views of nine papers from throughout Georgia and including Chattanooga under 
the heading “Herr Hardwick: How Georgia’s Junior Senator Is Viewed by the State Press.” The 
Brunswick News, for example, urged Hardwick to repent his disloyalty “and crave forgiveness 
from a people who have always honored him and who might yet forgive and forget! Senator 
Hardwick does not look natural in the class with Tom Watson, and as a friend and well wisher, 
we urge him to break company with him and do so at once.” Other editorials rained wrath upon 
Hardwick: “Resign, Herr Hardwick! Abandon your country that you admit has gone wrong! Go 
to your Kaiser while the going is good!,” railed the Quitman Free Press; the Swainsboro Forest-
Blade humorously noted, “Hardwick is objecting to so many things, we suppose he’ll also object 
to getting licked for re-election.” All the comments from the Telegraph’s summary condemn the 
senator’s antiwar stance.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “Georgia’s Senators,” New York Times, 26 July 1917, 9. 
41 “Herr Hardwick: How Georgia’s Junior Senator Is Viewed by the State Press,” Macon Telegraph, 9 July 1917, 4. 
In addition to those quoted in the text, other selections chosen from this Telegraph editorial are illustrative. From the 
Brunswick News (“Hardwick Blunders”): “It is indeed an impossible task to comprehend and explain [Hardwick’s] 
unnecessary attack on President Wilson at Columbus on July 4. . . . Would he impugn the patriotism of those sturdy 
Americans—ten millions of them in round numbers—who answered the nation’s call?”; from the Quitman Free 
Press (“The Hun at Our Door”): “Herr Thomas Wilhelm Hardwick, the friend of the Kaiser, has brought the German 
war into the confines of Georgia. Rolling sedition under his tongue. . . . [w]ith his Teutonic arrogance. . . . he has for 
the moment shocked the sensibilities of decent people. . . . Without attempting to discover by just what process he 
was alienated from his patriotism and his country and his pre-election pledges, let us suggest ‘safe conduct’ for this 
alien, who trifles with common decency, to the German Reichstag, where he will find a setting more congenial than 
will ever exist in ‘The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave.”; from the Southwest Georgian (“Not Sur-
prised”): “If Hardwick expected his Columbus speech to make a hit, he must have gone back to Washington a dis-
appointed man. People listen to and swallow a lot of foolishness and demagoguery in normal times, but these are 
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Newspaper readers had their say as well—at least, those readers whose views fell in step 
with the prowar editors. Whatever opposition existed was muted in editorials that selected patri-
otic missives as representatives of the voices at large; occasional letters expressing discontent 
with the war or a paper’s coverage of antiwar politics ran exclusively as an opportunity for a pa-
per to respond with its own brand of editorial superiority in the matter. Local papers had few ex-
tra pages and little extra space to devote to letters to the editor, be they prowar or against it; larg-
er papers such as the Atlanta Constitution regularly ran letters from readers who were angry with 
antiwar politicians. After Cobb’s speech in July, readers’ sights were on Thomas Hardwick. 
A Confederate Civil War veteran “who had to subsist on an ounce of lard and a pint of 
cowpeas per day, and finally on mule meat” during his own war wrote the Constitution and won-
dered, since draft dodgers could be punished for not going to war, “how much more ought Sena-
tor Hardwick to be punished if he leads [them] into disloyalty!” The same writer gave “all honor 
and praise to Judge Cobb. . . . What a grand thing it is to be a true man—a man among men!”42 
On 9 July, the Constitution ran three letters concerning Cobb and Hardwick, including one from 
a Demorest, Georgia, native claiming to represent a group of Georgians gathered for the summer 
term at Peabody College in Nashville: “Surely [Hardwick] does not represent the people of 
Georgia when he opposes pushing the war to a decisive and glorious victory for freedom and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
war times when men are doing their own reading and thinking”; from the Pearson Tribune (“No Time for Quib-
bling”): “Down with Hoke Smith! Down with Thomas Hardwick! Both are out of harmony with the pressing needs 
of the country. . . . Georgia doesn’t need these men . . . to misrepresent her attitude toward the war, who pull back 
when an unbroken front to the enemy is needed. This is no time for quibbling over methods; the country is involved 
in a gigantic war and the enemy must be met and relegated to the rear. We must follow our leaders who are in su-
preme command if we would be true to our country”; from the Chattanooga Times (“Worth Making Note Of”): “We 
wonder if Senator Hardwick . . . noticed the vote of the Georgia House of Representatives—[unreadable numbers in 
original, but it is a three-digit number in favor and a single digit against]—on the resolution that was adopted indors-
ing [sic] President Wilson’s war policy. His clap-trap use of the borrowed phrase, ‘If this be treason, make the most 
of it,’ in opposition to the war policy of the Government was too hollow and specious to be effective with the patri-
ots of the great State of Georgia.”  
42 “Veteran of Vicksburg Pays His Respects to Hardwick,” Atlanta Constitution, 12 July 1917, 6. 
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liberty.”43 Another reader from Boston, Georgia, who represented and supported Hardwick at the 
state convention wrote that it “hurts me and grieves me . . . that I cannot take his part nor defend 
the record he has made in congress” with votes “against the best interest of the common people 
in Georgia . . .”44 Yet another politely chastised the senator for overstepping his position, which 
was the crux of the current condemnation of the senator; the reader stated, “in all fairness to Mr. 
Hardwick,” that Wilson’s responsibility in leading the nation in war was “much greater” than 
Hardwick’s.45  
The Thomasville Times-Enterprise ran an editorial that summer that began with a request 
from a reader to cancel his or her subscription, complaining that “I don’t want a partial paper.”46 
The editors glibly assured their dissatisfied reader those wishes would be fulfilled “to the letter” 
and proclaimed, “We have never been accused of being partial on a side that was more to our 
liking than in aiding the government in every phase of its effort . . .” Aside from the inherent su-
periority that drips from this editorial, the most remarkable statement was in the explanation why 
they were happy to be partial: “We are doing our duty as a patriotic citizen: no deflections will 
make us swerve from that course . . .” The newspaper considered itself not only acting as any 
American citizen should, with a “sincerity of purpose and fealty to our nation”; the editors con-
sidered the paper was a citizen with the “duty” to stand behind the president and the war.47 The 
attacks on Hardwick continued unabated at least through August, though Smith seemed to catch 
a break in the press as focus shifted to the unapologetic junior senator. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 “Georgia Draft Boys Resent It,” Atlanta Constitution, 9 July 1917, 4. 
44 “Hardwick Leader in Thomas Expresses His Amazement,” Atlanta Constitution, 13 July 1917, 8. 
45 “Prefers President’s Judgment to That of Senator Hardwick,” Atlanta Constitution, 14 July 1917, 4. 
46 “Loyalty to Our Nation,” Thomasville Times-Enterprise, 27 August 1917, 2. Presented online by the Digital Li-
brary of Georgia. 
47 Ibid. 
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Another character under attack by editorialists throughout the state was Thomas E.  
Watson. A powerful former Populist, he had such reach and influence in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century that Georgia gubernatorial candidates had little hope of winning the office 
without the support of the “sage of McDuffie” County. Watson was known as the voice of the 
common agrarian in Georgia and had unsuccessfully run for president as a Populist. Despite 
making little political impact on the national scene, Watson’s words were followed closely by 
farmers in rural Georgia. Watson was a vocal and adamant critic of the war as a whole, especial-
ly the Selective Service Act. Watson’s influence on the war debate—his defense in federal court 
of two black draftees for failing to register as well as the banning of his weekly publication, the 
Jeffersonian, under the auspices of the Espionage Act in the summer of 1917—have been fully 
covered elsewhere, particularly by C. Vann Woodward and Jeanette Keith.48 But Watson’s at-
tacks on the president and the war were noted in and opposed by the press for much of the sum-
mer of 1917. The Americus paper in early June conjectured that Watson’s antiwar rhetoric had 
“stirred up the powers that be” in Washington, and then glibly dismissed Watson: “Our idea of 
something not to worry about is what will become of the Honorable Thomas if he falls into the 
clutches of Uncle Sam’s indefatigable minions.”49  
Though this study offers little new evidence concerning Watson’s nationally documented 
fight against the war and the draft, aside from this widespread ridicule he received from the press 
in his own home state, the newspapers’ opposition to Watson became central to the editorial case 
against Thomas Hardwick after the first week of July. Especially in August, papers routinely re-
ferred to the “noisy and objectionable” “Tom-Tom” problem in the state—meaning Tom  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For a full biography of Tom Watson, the go-to volume is still C. Vann Woodward’s Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel 
(1938); Keith’s Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight (2008) offers a concise summary of Watson’s activities and 
opposition in the summer of 1917. 
49 Untitled editorial in column 1, Americus Weekly Times-Recorder, 7 June 1917, 2. Presented online by the Digital 
Library of Georgia. 
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Watson’s avowed opposition to the president and Tom Hardwick’s roadblocking efforts against 
administration measures.50 The linking of these two politicians with such a demeaning moniker 
is even more interesting given that Hardwick and Watson were professed political enemies; their 
volatile relationship went back to at least 1910.51 Hardwick certainly did not endear himself to 
critics when, in August, he sought to defend his political foe with a resolution of inquiry in the 
Senate, demanding it investigate Postmaster General Albert Burleson’s banning of Watson’s 
weekly newspaper (as well as the banning of a socialist paper in New York called the Masses.)52 
The Thomasville paper said on 25 August, “We knew Hardwick was down the scale a long  
way recently, but we never thought he would descend to the point where he could defend the  
Masses [sic].”53 
 
Hardwick’s Downhill Battle 
Though this chapter mainly explores criticism of Smith and Hardwick through summer 
1917, Hardwick especially continued to be pummeled by the press through 1918. In January of 
that year, the former president of the Georgia Senate, G. Ogden Persons, denounced Hardwick in 
a speech at Piedmont College in Demorest, Georgia. Persons recounted Hardwick’s bitter oppo-
sition to the food bill and the selective draft. In a somewhat magnanimous gesture that few others 
had demonstrated in attacking Hardwick, Persons said the senator had a “perfect right” to oppose 
the president’s policies until they became law (as previously noted, many attacks on Hardwick 
began with his opposition to war and the draft during the debate and ignored the fact that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 “Georgia’s Combination of Toms,” Savannah Press, quoted in Americus Times-Recorder, 30 August 1917, 2. 
Presented online by the Digital Library of Georgia. This paper’s reference is but one of many who linked Watson 
and Hardwick as “tom-tom.” 
51 “Judge Speer to Hear Watson Cases Today,” Atlanta Constitution, 18 August 1917,10.  
52 Ibid.; and “Hardwick Prodding Postal Department,” Atlanta Constitution, 22 August 1917, 2. 
53 Untitled editorial in column 1, Thomasville Times-Enterprise, 25 August 1917, 2. Presented online by the Digital 
Library of Georgia. 
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Hardwick insisted the law must be followed after passage), but that Hardwick had “brought re-
proach upon the people of his state by making it appear that they were disloyal.”54 Persons fur-
ther lumped Hardwick “in the class with La Follette, Stone, Vardaman, Gronna and Gore, who 
have been hailed in the newspapers of Berlin as German sympathizers and friends of the  
kaiser.”55 In May, William Schley Howard, a US congressman from Georgia, threw his hat into 
the ring to take on Hardwick in that year’s Senate election; Howard called Hardwick a “rubber-
stamp senator” in universal opposition to “that great, splendid, glorious, perfect example of de-
mocracy, Woodrow Wilson . . .”56  
One cannot speak in universal terms about how Georgians felt about the war, but politi-
cians do not get elected by sitting on the unpopular side of the fence. The rhetoric employed by 
Howard—both against Hardwick and for Wilson—is a strong indicator of the beliefs of Geor-
gia’s voters. In the end, Howard and Hardwick both lost the Democratic primary to William J. 
Harris, a pro-Wilson candidate—and Wilson’s handpicked choice due to a new primary law57—
who had jumped into the 1918 Senate race during summer 1917 when the heat was steadily turn-
ing up on Hardwick. Harris claimed the primary with 71,723 votes to Howard’s roughly 42,000 
and Hardwick’s almost 40,000.58 The Constitution firmly declared the election a referendum on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Says Hardwick Is a Reproach to Ga.,” Atlanta Constitution, 20 January 1918, 3. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. Howard also did not spare Hoke Smith: “Mr. Howard made the unequivocal statement that in respect to Sen-
ator Smith’s actions on the war measures he stood exactly as he did towards Mr. Hardwick, and if he was running 
against Smith in this race, he would ‘take the hide off of him.’” Incidentally, the 1918 Georgia Democratic primary 
was carried by William J. Harris, who had announced his candidacy in the busy political summer of 1917. 
57 “William J. Harris Sweeps State with 112 Counties in Primary,” Atlanta Constitution, 12 September 1918, 1. The 
paper refers to the “Neill primary law” and the state’s complex unit system of voting districts; this law specifically 
would have allowed “a minority to capture the unit vote”—not dissimilar to the Electoral College in presidential 
elections. When Clark Howell, the state’s Democratic committee chairman, notified Wilson that summer of the law 
and its potential to influence the state election, Wilson had “urg[ed] the loyal voters of Georgia to concentrate upon 
William J. Harris” in a letter the Constitution claimed “became the feature of the campaign during the closing 
month.” The Constitution and many other Georgia papers, according to this article, had dutifully backed Harris. 
58 “Official Primary Vote Announced,” Atlanta Constitution, 29 September 1918, 4. Though these results are for a 
primary, these were Democratic candidates in the solidly Democratic South, thus these primary results assured vic-
tory in the election. 
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support of the president and stated that Harris’s win “has demonstrated the loyalty of the people 
of Georgia to the administration of President Wilson in the crisis of war” and “an equally over-
whelming defeat of Senator Hardwick.”59 It is interesting to note that Governor Hugh Dorsey 
was reelected unopposed with 162,076 votes, about 4,000 votes more than the total cast for the 
Senate race. Whether this speaks to confusion about the differences among the senatorial candi-
dates, a lack of faith in the candidates, Wilson’s meddling,60 or some other cause is unknown. 
Despite the Atlanta paper’s declaration, it is impractical to assume all voters voted based on a 
prowar or antiwar stance; each candidate represented views on multiple issues. However, when 
looking at the support or opposition to Wilson alone, the two pro-Wilson candidates—Wilson’s 
favorite, Harris, and Howard, who supported Wilson but had refused to leave the race when Wil-
son cast his lot with Harris—garnered a total of almost 114,000 votes to Hardwick’s 40,000. The 
Constitution had predicted Hardwick would come in second, with 39 counties; in fact, Hardwick 
only took 18 counties, indicating that the otherwise “remarkable accuracy” of the paper’s fore-
cast overestimated opposition to the war.61 
By 1918, and even much earlier, it had become clear that in Georgia, as in other states, 
dissent would not be tolerated by that most powerful voice, the press. Whether a wholehearted 
foe of Wilson’s drive to war, like Hardwick, or a legislative tinkerer but ultimate supporter, like 
Smith, the newspaper press (and the public it chose to give voice to) declared a single opinion. 
One was for the war, or against it; either a patriot, or a traitor. 
Trying to discern whether the press truly believed in the war effort to the extent spelled 
out in editorials is tricky, though some reasonable assumptions can be made. During the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “William J. Harris Sweeps State,” Atlanta Constitution; see subsection titled “Uniting on Harris Won the Big  
Victory.” 
60 Ibid. 
61 “Covering the State,” Atlanta Constitution, 13 September 1918, 8. 
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Espionage Act debate, the press opposed President Wilson’s attempt to have a press censorship 
resolution inserted, instead demonstrating through editorials how such a law was unnecessary 
given the voluntary censorship self-imposed by newspapers upon themselves. Ultimately, the 
censorship law was excluded from the Espionage Act, though Postmaster General Burleson took 
immediate action the day after the act was passed to warn local postmasters, in a secret memo, to 
be on the lookout for any publications that might instill in readers an opposition to the war.62 
Though Burleson effectively shut down several press operations—including the Jeffersonian and 
socialist Max Eastman’s Masses—it is interesting to note that the Espionage Act passed in June 
1917 did not specifically forbid the press from publishing antiwar sentiments. Such language was 
included later in the Sedition Act.63 Such minutia of law did not prevent federal judges in 1917 
from upholding the post office’s case against the Jeffersonian and the eventual criminal prosecu-
tion of the editors of the Masses. The judge in the Jeffersonian case unsympathetically referred 
to Watson’s antidraft stance as “poison,” and the US attorney who prosecuted the case said Wat-
son “should go in a hole and pull it in after him . . .”64 
Thus, true press opposition to the war was clearly difficult to come by if opposition 
meant loss of distribution. After the banning of the Masses and the Jeffersonian, the press knew 
any antiwar statements could lead to loss of postal access and thus, possibly, the death of the 
publication with no affordable means of distribution. But it does not follow that because a publi-
cation did not run antiwar editorials it was in a paper’s best interest to run extreme prowar/pro-
Wilson editorials instead. Just because war opposition meant a fight with Burleson did not mean 
newspapers instead needed to pad their editorials with attacks on antiwar figures or fill them with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 152.  
63 See appendix. The applicable section in each act, section 3, is 122 words long in the original Espionage Act of 
June 1917; amended in May 1918, the sedition amendments are almost four times as long at 465 words. There are 
three references in the amended version to uttering, writing, printing, and publishing. 
64 Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You, 154. 
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prowar messages to show unquestioning support. It stands to reason that where one finds editori-
al attacks on Tom Watson and Tom Hardwick, for example, in Georgia papers and elsewhere, 
there is no reason to disbelieve the authenticity of the sentiments. Local papers knew their own 
communities and constituencies; what would it benefit them to become mouthpieces of propa-
ganda that might inflame the passions of, and minimize readership or advertising by, the locals? 
Rural opposition to the war in Georgia and other southern states is well documented and not dis-
puted here, but newspapers did offer an authentic and often unquestioning support for Wilson 
and thus the war. The full impact of that support in Georgia is still to be studied.  
This chapter showed how the press in Georgia interpreted the war for Georgia citizens. 
To what extent editors and newspaper owners opposed the war is uncertain because strict rules 
against publishing were in effect at least from the passing of the Espionage Act and most defi-
nitely after the Sedition Act. But even before the Espionage Act, Georgia’s papers followed self-
imposed censorship. Newspapers throughout the United States were the primary means by which 
Americans perceived the war’s events and consequences. In Georgia, the overriding support for 
the war and demonization of dissenters was no less strong than anywhere else. The manner in 
which editors condemned Thomas Hardwick and Hoke Smith (as well as Tom Watson) as fig-
ures of embarrassment to the state is powerful evidence of how the Georgia press informed its 
readers of what constituted proper patriotic behavior as well as behavior that could not be toler-
ated. In the next chapter, I explore an official organization whose responsibility was to encourage 
wartime support among Georgia counties and towns. 
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CHAPTER 3: “INDIVIDUAL NEEDS AND CONDITIONS”: 
THE GEORGIA COUNCIL OF DEFENSE 
 
I should count myself a ‘slacker’ if I did not do all the Government asks of me. 
— Newton County council of defense chairman, 10 October 1918 
 
The Wilson administration tenaciously held to what it considered neutrality prior to Feb-
ruary 1917. But even by 1916, while US soldiers reinforced the frontier with Mexico and Gen-
eral John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition crossed the border in a futile search for Mexican re-
bel Francisco “Pancho” Villa, the president realized that America was unprepared for large-scale 
military conflict and had come to support certain preparedness measures. In June 1916, Congress 
passed and Wilson signed the National Defense Act, which authorized the federalization of state 
militias and restructured the roles of National Guard units in times of national crisis. In August 
that year, the Army Appropriation Act created the Council of National Defense (CND), “the first 
formal ‘preparedness’ body within the administration” with the initial mission of mobilizing the 
economy in the event of war.1 The CND provision also authorized the creation of state and 
community councils.  
This chapter explores the hitherto little explored state records of the Georgia Council of 
Defense (GCD). The state archive holds some fourteen cubic feet of records concerning this or-
ganization, whose job during World War I was to disseminate information coming down from 
the federal level to county and even city councils. As I explained in the introduction, historian 
William Breen, who conducted one of the first intensive studies of the CND and state councils 
using federal government sources, concluded that southern councils were generally ineffective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 4. 
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and exerted lackluster energy at best in conducting their official duties.2 Using the Georgia state 
records, I explore the origins of the Georgia council and highlight an increasing focus on com-
plying with national directives from the CND. These records do not necessarily contradict 
Breen’s assertion completely, but they do complicate it. In fact, by summer 1918 Governor Hugh 
M. Dorsey had a vested interest in making his state’s council more effective in its supplemental 
role to the federal government in order to garner federal support for a state canal project. What 
these Georgia-held records indicate is a frenetic effort by the GCD: sometimes apathetic, some-
times enthusiastic, and often fickle. They paint a picture of a state council trying to comply with 
certain coercive federal directives from the CND while also preserving Georgia’s independence 
as a southern state. 
 
Origins and Early Efforts 
William Breen found that the top-down organizational methods used by the CND “fit  
neither the modernizing U.S. economy nor the territorial imperatives of federal government de-
partments.”3 By the time the United States entered the war in 1917, economic mobilization was 
occurring at the federal level by sector (under new departments such as the Food Administration 
and the Fuel Administration) rather than by state. Jeanette Keith, whose work on southern atti-
tudes toward the war is heavily influenced by Breen’s work, argues that this left the national and 
state councils somewhat toothless for their original purposes; the councils wound up with the 
mission of organizing public support for the war.4 
Of all state councils, southern and southwestern states were least likely to provide effec-
tive funding, according to Breen’s study, but the reason is more nuanced than Breen concluded. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 112. 
3 Breen’s study is discussed in Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight, 137.  
4 Ibid., 137–38. 
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He does note that few southern states appropriated funds to their councils, instead raising funds 
through private donations. Breen also incorrectly states that the GCD only received from “the 
legislature . . . $2,500 for the state council work,” whereas Louisiana’s council received $25,000 
in 1917 and Maryland gave $2 million; Keith reuses Breen’s listed amounts.5 But the $2,500 on-
ly accounts for the initial allotment of funds by the 1917 legislature, for fiscal year 1918.6 The 
following Georgia Assembly session in summer 1918 appropriated, for the 1919 fiscal year, up 
to $20,000 to the GCD, “to be paid out only on the warrant of the Governor drawn for that  
purpose.”7 But with the war ending in November that year and the GCD disbanding two months 
into 1919, little of the $20,000 appropriation was used for GCD activities.8  
Keith asserts that Breen’s study “suggests that in Georgia and Mississippi the inefficiency 
may have been deliberate. Georgia governor . . . Dorsey had been elected with Tom Watson’s 
support and well knew that many of his constituents did not support the war.”9 Indeed, Breen 
cites federal reports on Georgia from an agent of the CND’s State Councils Section, Dr. James 
A.B. Scherer, who was president of what would become the California Institute of Technology; 
Scherer noted that populist Tom Watson “remained the master of the rural masses in Georgia and 
practically dictated the Democratic nominees for Governor from 1906 to 1920”—most likely a 
quote found in an appendix to an initial report, as the cited source is Scherer’s “Report on Geor-
gia” from 1917, which could not have included comments on gubernatorial elections in 1920. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 98–99. 
6 State of Georgia, “Part I, Title 1, Appropriations, Council of Defense,” Georgia Laws 1917 (Atlanta: Byrd Print-
ing, State Printers, 1917), 27. 
7 “Part I, Title 1, Appropriations, Council of Defense,” Georgia Laws 1918, 16. By comparison, Governor Dorsey’s 
salary was $5,000 (Georgia Laws 1918, 8). Of the $2,500 appropriated in 1917 for fiscal year 1918, all was used 
except for $9.12; see State of Georgia, “Treasurer’s Report, Receipts and Disbursements for Years, 1918–1917,” 
Georgia Laws 1919 (Atlanta: Byrd Printing, State Printers, 1919), 1459. 
8 State of Georgia, “Treasurer’s Report, Disbursements,” Georgia Laws 1920 (Atlanta: Byrd Printing, State Printers, 
1920). No page number is given in this volume, but the Treasurer’s Report immediately follows page 1800. The 
total GCD budget for 1919 was $20,000, of which $5,639.64 was disbursed for GCD activities. Of the remainder, 
$6,218.87 went to the state’s new Illiteracy Commission. For more on this commission, see the conclusion. 
9 Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight, 138. 
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Breen concludes, “Dorsey’s actions reflected the strength of the antiwar feeling in the state and 
his own political dependence to that group. He refused to permit the state council to act inde-
pendently and kept a very tight rein on its activities.”10 Breen further cites another Scherer re-
port, dated July 1917, critiquing Georgia’s council participation as “feeble though not wholly 
negligent in its cooperation with the federal government.”11 
Such statements—from reports originally dated in July 1917, a month before the Georgia 
Assembly even officially created the state council—inaccurately represent the GCD’s overall 
efforts. Furthermore, as will be seen from a deeper exploration of the GCD records held by the 
Georgia state archive, there is a dearth of evidence supporting Dorsey’s “very tight rein.” His 
involvement in the GCD was actually relatively minimal and mostly symbolic, and other GCD 
members took on most of the administrative duties.  
In Georgia, the General Assembly officially authorized the state council of defense on 21 
August 1917, almost five months after the country had declared war. Governor Dorsey sat at the 
head of operations,12 but within a year he was delegating day-to-day duties, such as they were, to 
Judge Price Gilbert, a justice on Georgia’s Supreme Court who held the title of chairman of the 
central committee of the council. To round out the sixteen official members, four came from 
state departments of commerce and labor as well as agriculture; the state schools superintendent; 
the adjutant-general; and eleven others appointed by the governor to represent broad swaths of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 101. The source cited is from the Council of National Defense records in Suitland, 
MD, referenced in Breen’s endnote no. 11 on page 231 in original. 
11 Ibid. See Breen’s endnote no. 12, page 231 in original. 
12 The governor who preceded Dorsey, Nathaniel E. Harris, left office on June 30, 1917, when Dorsey began the 
two-year term won in the previous November’s election. (Dorsey was reelected in November 1918 for another two 
years.) Early GCD documents, particularly those related to organization and establishment, contain Harris’s name as 
the head of the council, but in effect Harris had no input or leadership in the council once Dorsey took office. 
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the population and industrial sector: “one representative of labor,” “one . . . of the farmers,” “one 
minister of the gospel,” “one representative engineer,” etc.13  
Of almost immediate concern for the GCD was creating an atmosphere of support for the 
war, conscription, and Liberty Bond drives.14 One of the ways the council did this was by sup-
porting local chapters of the Four Minute Men, a group of speakers who gave patriotic, prowar, 
and progovernment speeches at public gatherings, particularly to audiences at movie theaters.15 
The Four Minute Men program was founded by the Committee for Public Information (which 
served as the United States’ principle propaganda department) as a way to disseminate infor-
mation to massed audiences who might otherwise not receive what the government felt was ac-
curate (or useful) news about the war and its repercussions—or, in some cases, might not receive 
any information at all. Bertram G. Nelson, the associate director of the division, summarized the 
mission of these speakers during the war:  
“[T]heir sons must help do the fighting; their minds, wills, and hearts must become at-
tuned to our national purposes. How can we reach them? Not through the press, for they 
do not read; not through patriotic rallies, for they do not come. Every night eight to ten 
million people of all classes, all degrees of intelligence, black and white, young and old, 
rich and poor, meet in the moving picture houses of this country, and among them are 
many of these silent ones who do not read or attend meetings but who must be 
reached.”16 
 
With commercial radio broadcasting still several years away, these volunteer speakers of-
fered a wide network for disseminating official government doctrine. It was a perfect example of 
how voluntarism was coerced in the realm of popular culture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Part I, Title 5—Miscellaneous, Council of National Defense, No. 195,” Georgia Laws 1917, 93–99. 
14 For a full analysis of the Liberty Bond campaigns, see Kennedy, Over Here, 99–105. 
15 The Four Minute Men moniker was both a reference to the Revolutionary War’s Minute Men and an accurate de-
scription of the maximum length of time a speaker was to address an audience. This time was supposedly chosen to 
coincide with the time it took for movie theaters to change reels during an intermission. See Ronald Schaffer, Amer-
ica in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 6.  
16 James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information 
1917–1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), 130. 
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George Creel, the journalist Wilson set in charge of the CPI, estimated after the war that 
his organization’s volunteer speakers gave 1 million speeches to an aggregate audience of more 
than 400 million, all on a government bill of just more than $140,000 for what Creel estimated 
should have cost the government $9.3 million.17  
The Georgia Four Minute Men were headed by Harrison Jones, an Atlanta attorney. As 
an example of the organization’s work in Georgia, Jones sent a letter to Governor Dorsey in Sep-
tember 1918 outlining the group’s achievements and requesting funds from the GCD for a ste-
nographer. In the letter, Jones proudly detailed the state’s thirty-nine local chairmen in thirty 
counties, with more than 300 speakers in total. Over a ten-month period, Jones wrote, speakers 
gave addresses on thirty-five subjects as directed by the Four Minute Men headquarters in  
Washington, DC: “In the Third Liberty Loan campaign Georgia Four Minute Men in three  
weeks made more than six hundred speeches and addressed audiences aggregating over 250,000 
people.”18  
Impressive as this sounds, the total number of speakers statewide was quite small when 
compared to the total number of Four Minute Men in service in the United States: Georgia’s rep-
resentation was 0.4 percent of the 75,000 volunteer speakers nationwide; Georgia’s thirty partic-
ipating counties was only 19.7 percent of the 152 counties in Georgia at that time.19 Whether this 
indicates a lack of interest in voluntarism in Georgia is not clear. The primary mission of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 125–26. This conceived amount included estimates of $4 million for 1 million speeches at $4 apiece, $2 
million “rent” of theaters (in actuality, theater houses donated their space and time), and $750,000 of free press pub-
licity, and $2.564 million for “contributed expenditures.” 
18 Letter from Harrison Jones to Governor Hugh M. Dorsey, 3 September 1918, “Four Minute Men, 1917–1918,” 
RCB 56819, GCD. Jones notes an attempt to organize in every county, but he blames the lack of response—“the 
usual reason for such failure”—on “failure to understand the significance of the movement and an inability to serve 
by those asked, due to other patriotic work . . . ” Any analysis or judgment of Jones’s success or failure must take 
into account the inordinate number of Georgia counties involved. Georgia’s total number of counties is second only 
to Texas. 
19 Of the 159 Georgia counties incorporated today, 152 were incorporated in the state as of the date of Jones’s letter 
to Dorsey; see http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/coundate.htm. Four Minute Men national statistics are from George 
Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920; reprinted by Arno Press, 1972), 85. 
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group was to speak in theaters (other venues were generally of secondary importance), and it is 
possible that some rural areas did not have a local movie house; any area without a theater might 
also have no need for Four Minute Men. 
For most of 1917 and the early months of 1918, the GCD records indicate a dutiful col-
lection and dissemination of bulletins and memos from the national council but little commit-
ment to action. Georgia’s inactivity during this period is evidenced by the lack of records con-
cerning any discernible achievements as well as numerous filed, and apparently unanswered, 
questionnaires and follow-up messages about these questionnaires from the CND. For example, 
George Porter, the chief of the state councils section at the national council, sent a rather simple 
two-page questionnaire to Dorsey (and all other state councils) on 22 March 1918 requesting in-
formation on county and community council organization, agricultural coordination, Americani-
zation efforts, and approved fundraising organizations.20 In April, several CND communiqués 
followed, including two Western Union telegrams, one of which explains: “Are preparing re-
ports on Southern States and feel we do Georgia injustice if complete record of activities is not 
available.”21 Again, in May, the CND sent a letter directly to Dorsey, stating, “Georgia is one of 
the four states that have failed to return the questionnaires sent to all State Councils on March 
22.”22 There is no evidence in the GCD records to indicate whether the lack of response was a 
deliberate slight to the CND, an oversight, or something that the GCD simply felt did not warrant 
a response or because it felt its organization was insufficient to effectively answer. At any rate,  
a week after this request, it appears that Georgia did finally respond to the questionnaire of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Letter and questionnaire from George Porter to Hugh Dorsey, 22 March 1918, “Bulletins and Correspondence, 
1918, January–March,” RCB 56819, GCD. 
21 Western Union telegram from National Council of Defense to Hugh Dorsey, 9 April 1918, “Bulletins and Corre-
spondence, 1918, April–July,” RCB 56819, GCD. 
22 Letter from Elliott Dunlap Smith, National Council of Defense, to Hugh Dorsey, 10 May 1918, “Bulletins and 
Correspondence, 1918, April–July,” RCB 56819, GCD. 
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22 March. The records hold a handwritten copy dated 17 May with terse, penciled-in answers to 
all but the last two questions.23 A letter from the head of the state councils section in October 
1918 evaluated Georgia’s response from mid-July 1917 through most of May 1918 and claimed 
“practically no action of any kind was taken by the Georgia State Council, even the acknowl-
edgement of letters from this office.”24 
 
Summer 1918: Georgia Fights for Independence 
While the GCD struggled to keep up with the general tracking efforts sought by the na-
tional council, the Georgia council fought outright the federal push for states to increase Ameri-
canization efforts. Over the summer of 1918 especially, Georgia and the CND went back and 
forth over the issue, with the CND and other national organizations gently pushing efforts to cre-
ate an Americanization program and the GCD steadfastly but politely refusing on the grounds 
that it wasn’t necessary in Georgia. The governing directive for this resistance actually came 
from Governor Dorsey, who in most aspects was rather hands-off in his role as chairman of the 
GCD.  
Still, Georgia, and Dorsey in particular, had a vested interest in making the federal gov-
ernment believe the state and the state council were making dedicated, good faith efforts to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Filled-out questionnaire, “Activities Undertaken in Response to Recommendations of the Council of National 
Defense,” 17 May 1918, “Bulletins and Correspondence, 1918, April–July,” RCB 56819, GCD. Among the re-
sponses, the questionnaire indicates a 75 percent organization at the county level—though there is no evidence in the 
records that 75 percent had actually organized; that the state had organized with the state agricultural college with a 
focus on food crops; that legal councils to offer advice to departing soldiers were in the works but that the state 
would not be publishing a booklet on the subject; and that no efforts at Americanization were in progress. The unan-
swered questions concerned enrollment of shipbuilders and child welfare efforts. It must be noted this questionnaire 
is not a carbon copy; its existence does not prove the filled-out questionnaire was sent, but there are no further re-
quests in the records from the CND asking for action on the 22 March questionnaire, which indicates some response 
was received at the national level.  
24 Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 101. Though Georgia’s activities during this suggested timeframe was indeed lacklus-
ter, one must be cautious in overbroadly interpreting lack of communication as lack of effort. Breen suggests that 
even in the Northeast, where state councils were notoriously vigilant and active, could be “intensely suspicious of 
federal initiatives” and “loath to reply to requests for information on its activities or to answer questionnaires sent 
out by the Washington office”; see Uncle Sam at Home, 54.  
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comply with the national government. In June, Dorsey and the leadership of Florida and Ala-
bama created a commission to explore the feasibility of a canal that would connect the narrow 
portions of Georgia and Florida between the St. Marys River on the Atlantic Coast and the Su-
wannee River, then down to St. Marks on the Gulf Coast of Florida. Such a waterway would of-
fer a coastal and intracoastal shipping lane to link the Mississippi River and the Atlantic coast. 
The canal project was Dorsey’s brainchild. J.W. Oglesby, the president of the South 
Georgia Railway Company in Quitman, Georgia, who was also active in the state’s labor com-
mission, became chairman of the committee. “The value of a protected waterway for barge 
transportation and for vessels of light draft, connecting the Mississippi river with the Atlantic 
Seaboard, may be worthy of very serious consideration,” Dorsey wrote in a statement on the ca-
nal project. “The recent activities of submarines along the Atlantic coast has brought home to us 
the dangers and horrors of this struggle. A submarine in a single day may sink ships and cargoes 
of a value more than sufficient to pay the entire cost of the proposed project.”25 Such an outlet 
for Mississippi River and Gulf Coast cargo on Georgia’s southernmost port would inevitably 
mean revenue for the state and a legacy for the governor who dreamed it up.  
The federal dollars required to build such a project would certainly be more feasible for a 
state that had proven its vital role in national defense efforts. The federal government did, in-
deed, show some interest in the project; the Georgia assembly found funds for the commission, 
which went to Washington in early September and even had a meeting with President Wilson.26  
Perhaps it is no coincidence that in May, two weeks before the announcement of the ca-
nal commission, Dorsey submitted a general eleven-page letter to the CND with updates on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Gulf to Atlantic Canal Is Urged on Suggestion of Govenor [sic] Dorsey,” Athens Banner, 12 June 1918, Box 934 
(unsorted press clippings), GCD. 
26 Letter from Price Gilbert to Elliott Dunlap Smith, 5 September 1918, “Bulletins and Correspondence, Primarily 
Organization, July–September 1918,” RCB 56820, GCD. 
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Georgia council’s activities. In the introduction, the governor asked forgiveness for Georgia’s 
lack of response on several fronts and assured the national council of Georgia’s nationalist zeal: 
“The citizenry of our state is naturally patriotic, and are [sic] keenly susceptible and quick to 
seize upon and effectively execute suggestions coming from authentic sources.”27 On the final 
page, after itemizing Georgia’s efforts, Dorsey offered what can only be described as a disclaim-
er, albeit a diplomatic one, asserting the state’s rights to accept or decline national directives: 
“We would have you understand clearly that it is our desire to cooperate in every way possible 
with the Council of National Defense and that we shall promptly and effectively put into opera-
tion every feasible plan you suggest, reserving only the right to pass upon the feasibility of using 
them, in the light of our intimate knowledge of Georgia and of her individual needs and  
conditions.”28  
In other state councils around the country, “Americanization” efforts sought to indoctri-
nate foreign-born elements to accepted and patriotic norms in order to strengthen American war 
efforts and sever ties of support for enemy homelands. The GCD wasn’t opposed to Americani-
zation, at least in theory, and neither were rural councils. As Independence Day approached in 
1918, the CND promoted the Fourth of July as an opportunity for foreign-born elements to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the United States; the task fell to county councils to implement cele-
brations of such caliber as to do justice to “the expression of unity of purpose which is welding 
nations together in the present struggle.”29 The GCD, through its assistant secretary, C. A. West, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Letter from Hugh Dorsey to Council of National Defense, 28 May 1918, page 2, “Bulletins and Correspondence: 
Primarily Organization, January–June 1918,” RCB 56820, GCD. 
28 Ibid., page 11. 
29 “Community Council Circular No. 3,” Council of National Defense, undated, “Fourth of July Celebration, 1918,” 
RCB 56824, GCD. 
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dutifully disseminated the info and requested reports from the county councils of any such cele-
brations so it could send them on to the national council.30  
The GCD files don’t demonstrate how many counties or areas decided to follow up on 
the Americanization programs, but two cities, Adel in Berrien County and Waycross in Ware 
County, both in rural South Georgia, are examples of two regions that took up the standard. The 
editor of the Adel News wrote to West and included a clipping from his newspaper detailing the 
Fourth of July pageant to be held there; the “Patriotic Program” followed the CND recommenda-
tions almost to the letter, from a beginning with the singing of “America” by the audience, the 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance by the Boy Scouts, and then a pageant with locals playing 
characters such as Humanity, Justice, Freedom, and each Allied nation.31 Ware County Council 
of Defense chairman V. L. Stanton wrote West and Dorsey on 5 July with details of his county’s 
celebrations: “Our success was very great and the heart of our people were with our great Nation, 
in deepest interest and with a spirit of sacrifise [sic]. The meeting was attended by many from the 
rural districts. The Speeches … were great—no greater made anywhere”; “it was a great day and 
the Ware County Council of defense [sic] did itself PROUD.”32  
Not every rural county, however, showed the same enthusiasm. The chairman of the 
Webster County (located approximately halfway between Americus and Columbus) council of 
defense, J. R. Stapleton, replied to West and the GCD directive with an update on local condi-
tions: “Relative to a 4th of July celebration, I beg to say that ours is a small agricultural county 
and we do not know of any foreign born citizen in the county. The farmers are [word is illegible] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “State of Georgia, Executive Department, Atlanta,” 26 June 1918, undated, “Fourth of July Celebration, 1918,” 
RCB 56824, GCD. The text in this memorandum to Georgia counties is mostly verbatim from the CND circular no. 
3 mentioned previously. 
31 “Adel Is to Fittingly Observe the Fourth,” Adel News, undated, “Fourth of July Celebration, 1918,” RCB 56824, 
GCD. 
32 Letter from V.L. Stanton to Hugh Dorsey, 5 July 1918, “Fourth of July Celebration, 1918,” RCB 56824, GCD; 
Letter from V.L. Stanton to C.A. West, 5 July 1918, “Fourth of July Celebration, 1918,” RCB 56824, GCD. 
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with their work owing partly to the labor having been called into military service, and we  
think best to let people work rather than give the time to any demonstrations. We need the work  
badly.”33 (The farmers’ plight concerning labor shortages is further revealed in the GCD records 
concerning the state’s farm furloughs program for soldiers in training who had not yet departed 
overseas.)34  
In late August, the Department of the Interior contacted the GCD, pushing Americaniza-
tion programs for Georgia’s four cities with populations that included 500 or more foreign-born 
citizens (per the 1910 census): Atlanta (4,501), Augusta (929), Macon (694), and Savannah 
(3,448).35 Whether the GCD responded is unknown. In September, the Kansas state council of 
defense requested info from the GCD concerning Georgia’s Americanization efforts, to which 
GCD Central Committee Chairman Price Gilbert replied, “The Georgia Council of Defense has 
issued no bulletins or literature on this subject. . . . The reason for this is that we have practically 
no foreign population. We have no trouble in regard to teaching German in the schools . . . [best 
to] exert our full strength along lines where work was really needed.”36 On 24 September, the 
executive secretary of the state councils section, Elliott Dunlap Smith, pushed the Interior De-
partment’s recommendation in an attempt to coerce the state with a compromise: Americaniza-
tion efforts focused on Atlanta and Savannah from a small state committee. “It seems to us that 
the number of foreign born in [Atlanta and Savannah] is sufficient to justify some kind of Amer-
icanization work,” wrote Smith. “Of course, you know local conditions better than we do, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Letter from J.R. Stapleton to C. A. West, 29 June 1918, “Fourth of July Celebration, 1918,” RCB 56824, GCD. 
34 For more on the farm furloughs program, see “Farm Furlough, June–September 1918,” RCB 56819, GCD. 
35 Letter from Interior Department to Georgia Council of Defense, 29 August 1918, “Americanization (folder 2 of 
3),” RCB 56819, GCD. 
36 Letter from F. H. Hamilton, Kansas State Council of Defense, to Georgia Council of Defense, 19 September 1918, 
“Americanization (folder 2 of 3),” RCB 56819, GCD; reply by Price Gilbert, Georgia Council of Defense, to F. H. 
Hamilton, 26 September 1918, “Americanization (folder 2 of 3),” RCB 56819, GCD.  
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you will be able to decide this question far better than we are, but we hope you will give the mat-
ter your most serious consideration.”37 Again, no reply is extant in the GCD records. 
The national council occasionally made demands of state councils without providing rec-
ommended guidelines for execution, so states often asked each other for advice or updates on 
how others were organizing programs. The California Commission of Immigration and Housing 
wrote Georgia (and other states) in mid-October, requesting coordination of Americanization ef-
forts to eliminate “counteracting and antagonistic influences” caused by the lack of a chief in 
charge of Americanization in Washington.38 Price Gilbert reasserted the message he’d sent to 
Kansas: Since Georgia’s foreign population was less than 1 percent, “we do not have enough to 
do to even attempt the americanization [sic] scheme. This matter should be thrashed out and left 
to the discretion of those States and individuals who have a problem on their hands and this State 
has practically no problem in this respect. I trust this explains the position of the Georgia Council 
of Defense.”39  
The Georgia records do not indicate whether the direct inquiries from the CND about 
Americanization were ignored, only that no responses to them are found in the records until 9 
October 1918, when Gilbert, responding to Elliott Dunlap Smith on another matter, added, “I am 
decidedly of the opinion that as to the Americanization project in Georgia there is not sufficient 
need to warrant it. . . . Of course I have the highest respect for your opinions, but I wonder if you 
really know how many other requirements are coming from other officials in Washington. We 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Letter from Elliott Dunlap Smith to Georgia Council of Defense, “Attention Mr. Price Gilbert,” 24 September 
1918, “Americanization (folder 3 of 3),” RCB 56819, GCD. 
38 Letter from Simon J. Lubin, 14 October 1918, “Americanization (folder 3 of 3),” RCB 56819, GCD. 
39 Letter from Price Gilbert to Simon Lubin, 24 October 1918, “Americanization (folder 2 of 3),” RCB 56819, GCD. 
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occasionally get requests and suggestions that are not only without merit, but are fraught with 
possible evil, besides being wholly unessential from a war stand-point.”40 
What Gilbert found “fraught with evil” was probably the push by the national council for 
Georgia to finally fall in step with the rest of the country on the issue of building materials and 
permits, to be discussed in the following section. What is evident, however, is that on the issue of 
Americanization, the GCD persistently resisted efforts to create what the state felt was a super-
fluous and “unessential” drain on Georgia’s already limited resources.41 Fighting imperatives 
that directly related to the war, however, would result in a cracking of the federal whip, as will 
be seen in Georgia’s resistance to the building materials permits in fall 1918. 
 
Fall 1918: Georgia Falls Into Step  
As mentioned above, Governor Dorsey was for the most part a figurehead in the GCD 
and generally delegated operations to others within the council. By summer 1918, however, the 
Georgia council (and thus the governor) was catching heat from the national council for its lack 
of action and enthusiasm concerning wartime efforts. Despite that eleven-page catch-up letter by 
Dorsey to the CND to illustrate what Georgia had done concerning wartime directives, accusa-
tions of Georgia’s less-than-stellar responses to CND requests persisted. For example, sometime 
on 1 May or slightly earlier, Secretary of War Newton Baker wired Dorsey directly: “[T]he 
Georgia State Council has reported no action in response to telegrams of Council of National De-
fense April eighth and ninth asking on behalf of Provost Marshal General Crowder that your 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Letter from Price Gilbert to Elliott Dunlap Smith, 9 October 1918, “Bulletins and Correspondence, Primarily Or-
ganization October–November 1918,” RCB 56820, GCD. 
41 Ibid., and letter from Price Gilbert to Interior Secretary Franklin Lane, 18 September 1918, “School Garden Ar-
my, 1918,” RCB 56824, GCD. Gilbert wrote to Lane: “[The GCD] will not have funds available to do the work re-
quired of it until after the first of January [when the Assembly’s budget allotment would kick in]. We are running it 
practically on a philanthropic basis at present, and have been from the first.” 
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State Council assist the local draft boards in preparing and transmitting the occupational  
cards. . . . Georgia lags behind every state in the union in performing this important work. . . .  
I urgently request that as Chmn. of your state council and as Governor you secure prompt action 
in this matter.”42 Given the timing of this telegram and the eleven-page letter mentioned above, 
the letter was most likely a belated response to the CND prompted by this pointed and accusatory 
telegram. 
In July, Dorsey requested help. At a war conference on 11 July, Georgia Supreme Court 
Justice Price Gilbert was appointed chairman of a new Central Committee of the Georgia Coun-
cil of Defense, becoming the point man for communications between the national council and the 
GCD.43 One of Gilbert’s first acts was to communicate the urgency to county councils to organ-
ize and report to the state council. The lesser local participation at the county level is evidenced 
throughout the GCD files (although that by no means insinuates that all counties were lackluster 
in their efforts; many took the responsibilities for organizing quite seriously). For example, a let-
ter to the GCD in September 1918 from the US Labor Department requested the name of the 
Four Minute Men leader in Fitzgerald, the seat of rural Ben Hill County in South Georgia; the 
reply from Gilbert’s office explained, “I am advised by Mr. Harrison [sic, Jones], Chairman, 
Four Minute Men Committee, State Council of Defense, that although he has tendered this 
Chairmanship to a number of gentlemen at Fitzgerald he has been unable to secure an acceptance 
and that in consequence he is without a Chairman at this point.”44 This is just one of many  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 “Copy of Telegram / Washington, D.C. 240P 27,” to Hugh Dorsey, “Bulletins and Correspondence, Primarily 
Organization January–June 1918,” RCB 56820, GCD. Dorsey’s telegram in response to Baker on 1 May 1918 in the 
same set of files helps date the message.  
43 Letter from Price Gilbert to Arthur Fleming, Chief, State Councils Section, 14 August 1918, “Bulletins and Corre-
spondence, Primarily Organization, July–September 1918,” RCB 56820, GCD. 
44 Letter from H. O. Rice, representing the US Department of Labor, to Governor Hugh M. Dorsey, 2 September 
1918, “Four Minute Men, 1917–1918,” RCB 56819, GCD. 
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examples of county councils, particularly in rural areas, disregarding requests from the state  
council. 
A month into his tenure as chairman of the central committee, Gilbert sent a letter to Ar-
thur Fleming, the chief of the state councils section of the CND, in which Gilbert introduced 
himself and asked for “specific requests” of the Georgia council by the CND rather than “the 
mere sending of bulletins.”45 A week later, Gilbert’s office distributed a form letter to all county 
councils of defense reprimanding those that were inactive or uncommunicative. “[A] number of 
[counties] excuse their inactivity and lack of organization upon the ground that they have never 
been specifically informed as to the duties required of them,” the letter stated. “With all due re-
spect for the opinions and judgments which differ from the plan outlined by the Government, 
you are urged to adopt the Government’s plan. This embraces uniformity and has been well 
thought out by the Council of National Defense.” A failure to report to the state council, Gilbert 
warned, “is a grave reflection on the governor . . . and upon our patriotic citizens as a whole.”46 
Just as the national council was coercing compliance by shaming the state, the state in turn 
passed the shame onto its counties. 
A flurry of activity followed as Gilbert cracked down on county organization and spear-
headed the GCD’s response on the many fronts it was receiving CND requirements. By the end 
of September Gilbert was trying to disengage from his GCD obligations to return to his Supreme 
Court duties, but he continued in an extremely engaged advisory role through the Armistice. 
Among the most pressing matters that came down the pike from the national council concerned 
conservation of building materials. This somewhat mundane topic proved to be the rallying point 
about which the national council pressed the Georgia council for compliance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Letter from Gilbert to Fleming, 14 August 1918. 
46 Letter from Price Gilbert “to the county councils of defense,” 21 August 1918, “Four Minute Men, 1917–1918,” 
RCB 56819, GCD. 
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On 11 September 1918, the CND state councils section sent out Bulletin 113, which out-
lined the War Industries Board’s (WIB) plan to curtail “proposed construction, in order that all 
building which is not absolutely necessary may be stopped.”47 The directive requested states cre-
ate a “small committee” of “disinterested” men of “broad experience” to oversee the individual 
organization of county and local councils. Two days later, D. R. McLennan, the chief of the new 
Non-War Construction Section of the WIB, followed up with an impassioned plea to the state 
councils of defense explaining the importance of this new program: “[T]his nation’s business . . . 
is WAR, and all other considerations must be subordinated to the paramount purpose of winning 
the war. . . . No loyal American can with any patience contemplate giving to our military authori-
ties less than ALL of their requirements to enable them in the shortest possible time to mobilize 
and bring to bear against the enemy the concentrated force of splendidly equipped armies. This 
can only be accomplished through the strictest economies in war materials, labor, fuel and trans-
portation.”48 McLennan’s three-page missive seems geared to stir the patriotic spirit of readers to 
overcome any opposition to this new government directive. It ended with a plea: “The success of 
this plan is largely in your hands. . . . May I, by return of mail, have your assurance that you have 
unreservedly enlisted in this cause until the war shall have been won?” 
Many state councils—for example, those in Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, Connecticut, and 
Pennsylvania—responded with efforts that William Breen, in his study of the Council of Nation-
al Defense, calls “impressive.”49 Gilbert’s initial response from Georgia, however, detailed the 
council’s lack of money: The GCD had no funds and was operating without a budget until the 
first of January, when the Assembly’s $20,000 budget allotment would be available. This time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 “Bulletin No. 113: Curtailment of Non-war Construction” from Council of National Defense, State Councils Sec-
tion, 11 September 1918, “Building Permits (folder 1 of 2), 1918,” RCB 56823, GCD.  
48 Letter from D. R. McLennan to the Several State Councils of Defense, 13 September 1918, “Building Permits 
(folder 1 of 2), 1918,” RCB 56823, GCD. 
49 Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 183. 
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however, Gilbert was less coy in declining to take on the new responsibilities. “We are utterly 
unable to undertake this work,” Gilbert wrote. “[W]e are at an utter loss to know how we can be 
of any service in this matter.”50  
The WIB and the CND pushed back, strongly. Several communiqués followed. Gilbert 
went so far as to return unspecified WIB documents to Edward Inman, the WIB representative in 
Atlanta, “on the ground that we have not received any official advices that the same are within 
our jurisdiction”—though such official advices were clearly contained in the text of the bulletins 
as well as D. R. McLennan’s letter of 13 September.51 (After the busy exchange described be-
low, Gilbert explains in a letter to Arthur Fleming that Bulletin 113, which contained the details 
of the new directive, “was found mislaid in the Governor’s office.”52) The following day, Gilbert 
even told a county council representative from Griffin that “we have no official advices from 
Washington that constructions [sic] matters are within the jurisdiction of the Council of De-
fense.”53 Gilbert also wrote to Arthur Fleming, the head of the CND, in an attempt to clarify 
Georgia’s position: “If it is a fact that jurisdiction has been conferred upon us I would deem the 
same to be very unfortunate. The Georgia Council of Defense already has more than it can han-
dle with its present organization.”54 Gilbert then asks Fleming for an “official” request for GCD 
action, plus “full directions in regard thereto, otherwise many applications will accumulate and 
much confusion will arise, delays will be irritating and expensive to parties concerned.”55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Letter from Price Gilbert to Edward H. Inman, Regional Adviser, War Industries Board, 16 September 1918, 
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51 Letter from Price Gilbert to Edward H. Inman, 18 September 1918, “Building Permits (folder 1 of 2), 1918,” RCB 
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52 Letter from Price Gilbert to Arthur Fleming, 26 September 1918, “Building Permits (folder 1 of 2), 1918,” RCB 
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56823, GCD. 
55 Ibid. 
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Not surprisingly given that the information and directions Gilbert was requesting were 
explicitly spelled out in the previous bulletins and letters, Fleming responded both to Gilbert and 
with a telegram to the governor. The telegram to Dorsey was blunt: “Will you not confer with 
him [Gilbert] in order that your state shall not fail in putting through probably biggest single job 
yet given State Councils Defense by any Federal agency.”56 To Gilbert, Fleming’s telegram, and 
a letter sent the same day, was pointed. It stated clearly that the directives Gilbert requested were 
in Bulletin 113 and McLennan’s follow-up letter. “Cannot understand failure receive these [sic],” 
Fleming wired. “If state councils were to be used at all in the plan it had to be on nation wide 
scale we shall rely on state of Georgia to hold up its end of national defense system which it can 
do only by giving adequate support to its state council.” The telegram ends with a polite but stern 
request for Gilbert to acknowledge receipt of Bulletin 113 and the telegram itself.57 
Though the tone of Fleming’s responses indicates disbelief that Gilbert might have actu-
ally not received the information in question, there is nothing in the GCD records to indicate 
Gilbert was deliberately spurning the new responsibilities with disingenuous confusion. Some of 
Gilbert’s correspondence with Edward Inman references letters he had received from Inman; the 
records don’t include all of those letters to Gilbert from Inman, but it is possible these missing 
letters may have been the first indication to Gilbert that a new duty was required of the state 
council. If those letters did not explicitly state the information that was in the bulletin sent out on 
11 September, which was purportedly lost at the governor’s office for several weeks, Gilbert’s 
befuddlement is understandable. However, McLennan’s letter, sent two days later and presuma-
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bly separately, is less easy to explain, as it detailed the manner of organization in almost as much 
detail as the original bulletin. 
At any rate, Gilbert submitted a form letter to several individuals asking for their service 
on the new building permits council. He wrote McLennan in late September to express the 
GCD’s intention “to do its best, in good faith, to carry out this new burden placed upon it.”58 
Gilbert then addressed several questions concerning the approval/disapproval process—what 
cost limits were in place, what to do with existing construction versus new construction, etc. He 
decried the lack of the “franking” privilege—the free use of the mails for official purposes—in 
disseminating Washington’s official memorandums to county councils (a valid concern given the 
lack of available funds for any official GCD work until 1 January 1919). “[I]t looks like nearly 
every other person working for the Government in similar ways has the franking privilege, even 
a negro employee of the Department of Labor . . . has the franking privilege.” Gilbert’s defensive 
tone diminished toward the end of the letter, where he wrote, “This may sound like an ill tem-
pered snarl, but it is not so intended. It is simply intended to impress upon you the total inade-
quacy of our situation and what we must contend against.” The solution, Gilbert concluded, was 
for Washington to extend the franking privilege or to send the information to Georgia’s county 
councils directly. 59 
Gilbert continued in his capacity as chairman of the central committee throughout most 
of October, continuing his back and forth with McLennan over the details of the building permits 
program and continually requesting that Bulletin 113 be sent directly to the county councils, 
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frank to a designated “Federal Field Secretary,” a new position created by the restructuring of the State Councils 
Section into a more cohesive Field Division: “This removed a point of friction between the federal government and 
the state organizations and was an official recognition of the important work that the state agencies of the Field Di-
vision were doing.” See Breen, Uncle Sam at Home, 182. 
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which were inundating the GCD offices in Atlanta with demands for information on how to ap-
prove or disapprove construction projects. 
Sometime in late October, Gilbert handed over the reins to Sam J. Slate, who took over 
main correspondence with the national council as secretary of the Georgia Council of Defense. 
With this transition of power came a definitive change in attitude. Whereas Gilbert was a harried 
diplomat, Slate was an impatient bulldog given to peevish language and prone to accuse others of 
incompetence. Slate had been active in the GCD in other capacities, but as secretary, he demand-
ed the national council recognize Georgia’s unique situation, e.g., lack of funds to mail circulars 
to county councils and an apparently constant dearth of bulletins for the GCD to disseminate. He 
put the onus on the national council in a letter to McLennan in early November. “We have 152 
Councils in Georgia and it is impossible for us to get this detail information out until you furnish 
us with the proper number for forms and circulars. . . . We have waited patiently for the applica-
tions which have been more than a month in coming and you sent us 8 - #21 circulars [a revised 
version of Bulletin 113] and state the balance will be forwarded in a few days.”60  
A few days later, Slate wrote again to McLennan, saying an insufficient number of circu-
lars had been received, and the impetus was on Washington to supply the right documents if 
Georgia was expected to comply. “We are very short of help and we cannot undertake to supply 
your failure to have people who are unable to count to 152,” Slate wrote. “We regret to have to 
talk so plainly about this but our office force is limited and if we expect to do any work we can-
not take time to keep up with the blunders made on your end. . . . We cannot understand how you 
expect the State Council to continue to send out the Priority requests and not furnish the franked 
envelopes to do it, when little Agents in Washington who are simply ‘beating their own little 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Letter from Sam J. Slate to D. R. McLennan, 4 November 1918, “Building Permits (folder 2 of 2), 1918,” RCB 
56823, GCD. 
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drums’ come here with all kinds of franking and telegraphic privileges, whereas postage alone 
nearly eats up our annual appropriation.”61  
Confusion persisted as Georgia’s county councils submitted approval forms to the na-
tional council, which in turn sent them back to the GCD to be sent back to the county councils 
where they originated. Meanwhile, Slate demanded the national council supply the proper blank 
applications to be used in the approval process. Two weeks after the Armistice, as the Non-War 
Construction Section prepared to wrap up its duties and issue a final report, Slate responded testi-
ly to the request for a report from Georgia: “[W]e desire to state that Georgia has no report to 
make. You need not defer closing up the work of your Department waiting on this report as we 
are unable to compile same at this Office owing the delay in procuring the proper form at the 
right time.”62 
It would be overly simplified to state that these correspondences prove a general senti-
ment of support for the war. One also should not overemphasize aspects of state resistance to the 
federal push for compliance that intensified near war’s end. The GCD operated within a complex 
realm of federal demands that required the state, with its limited budget, to seek voluntary com-
pliance from its equally cash-strapped and often labor-strapped satellite councils. What these 
files show, then, are the complex struggles of the Georgia Council of Defense. Its leaders tried to 
maintain the state’s sovereignty over its own affairs—and budget—while genuinely attempting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Letter from Sam J. Slate to D. R. McLennan, 7 November 1918, “Bulletins and Correspondence, Primarily Organ-
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Shoe Section on the same date: “It is an extremely strange thing to us that you do not possess people in Washington 
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War Industries Board, 7 November 1918, “Bulletins and Correspondence, Primarily Organization, October–
November 1918,” RCB 56820, GCD. 
62 Letter from Sam J. Slate to Non-war Construction Section, 25 November 1918, “Building Permits (folder 2 of 2), 
1918,” RCB 56823, GCD. 
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to do what they felt was necessary for the nation in wartime and convince Georgia citizens to do 
the same.  
Many of these exchanges do support the basic contentions of Jeanette Keith and William 
Breen: Georgia’s state and local councils of defense, like those of other southern states, generally 
did not engage their missions with the same fervor as those in the west or the north, regions 
where the historiography has proven deep wartime support. The low number of Four Minute 
Men and the evidently low county participation in GCD endeavors indicate collectively that in 
some areas, the war and its requirements were less popular than was evidenced in the newspaper 
attacks on Smith and Hardwick.  
Still, Keith’s and Breen’s conclusions do not take into account the dedicated efforts at 
Georgia’s state level, particularly during the flurry of increased activity from late summer 1918 
until the end of the war and into the new year. Gilbert’s communications with local councils as 
well as with Fleming and McLennan at the national level indicate an effort to support national 
imperatives while maintaining Georgia’s independence. As head of the press wing, Isma Dooly 
of the Atlanta Constitution consistently and doggedly worked to disseminate CND and GCD 
propaganda, which also indicates an authentic effort to share information and garner support for 
the war effort despite rural and local opposition or apathy. 
In this chapter I challenged previous explorations of the GCD, particularly William 
Breen’s comprehensive study that looked at the state’s council primarily through federal records 
rather than records saved by the state itself. Given the limitation of those records, Breen looked 
at the South as a region rather than exploring Georgia as a singular state. The events shared in 
this chapter generally support the assertion that southern states showed very lackluster support 
for the domestic war effort. But as concerns Georgia, this argument only holds up for roughly the 
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first year of the GCD’s existence. From spring 1918 on, the GCD’s efforts ramped up considera-
bly, yielding an eight-fold increase in budget allotment for the 1919 fiscal year. Particularly  
under Price Gilbert’s leadership, who performed his official council duties voluntarily (at the 
governor’s request) and by all accounts diligently, the GCD navigated rough bureaucratic terrain 
and tried to please more than one master: the federal government and its own citizens. It cracked 
down on slacker counties and tightened state control over community councils with coercive dis-
course that challenged local councils to either participate in council activities or contribute to the 
state’s shame by inaction. The picture that emerges is less that of a state where “inefficiency may 
have been deliberate.”63 Rather, a blurry image emerges of a budget-strapped and labor-deficient 
state navigating a federal structure that was becoming more centralized and a federal economy 
that offered fiscal rewards to states that submitted to federal authority. Georgia was evolving, 
from merely a southern state with a need to protect its own self-interest into one with a more in-
volved place within the Union. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight, 138. Keith asserts that Dorsey may have intentionally withheld sup-
port of the GCD because he owed his governorship heavily to support by Tom Watson, who represented a large por-
tion of the Georgia populace who did not support the war. 
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CONCLUSION 
After the Armistice on 11 November 1918, the country turned to demobilization and the 
Treaty of Versailles. This study has shown that the atmosphere of coercive voluntarism that 
swept the Unites States during the First World War also swept Georgia, with strong pockets of 
support influencing the citizenry through various coercive means. Then troops started to come 
home and the long debate over the peace treaty and the League of Nations began. With the rise 
of the debate on how the United States would engage other world powers in the future, coercion 
to support the war effort evolved into a domestic crisis in many parts of the United States with 
the arrival of the nation’s first Red Scare. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer fueled the fire of 
anti-Communism with a bellows of fearmongering rhetoric and a series of raids to root out spies 
that have ever since been known as the Palmer Raids.1 In Georgia the targets of civilian vigi-
lance, and vigilantism, were blacks, particularly amid the backdrop of a renascent Ku Klux Klan, 
which had risen from its Reconstruction era ashes in 1915 in Georgia and gained increasing 
membership in the postwar period. The Klan would gain and maintain a powerful influence on 
Georgia politics well into the 1920s.2  
As Georgia slowly retreated from its wartime support of “100 percent Americanism” 
back to its prewar attitudes of white supremacy and isolation, a few of its wartime initiatives met 
with varying degrees of success. Dorsey’s canal commission survived long enough to appoint 
commissioners and get tacit approval from Congress for surveys and a study. Wilson’s succes-
sor, Warren G. Harding, opposed federal funds for water transportation development and killed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See in general Ann Hagedorn’s study of the domestic scene in 1919 and her excellent interpretation of the Palmer 
Raids in Savage Peace: Hope and Fear in America, 1919 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007). 
2 For more on the Klan in the twentieth century, see Nancy MacLean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of 
the Second Ku Klux Klan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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the early attempts at a St. Marks–St. Marys canal.3 Interest in a canal surged again in 1929 and 
1930, but the canal was never built. 
Before the GCD dissolved itself in a final meeting in February 1919, the council 
launched a statewide literacy initiative. M. L. Brittain, the state schools commissioner and a 
longtime proponent of literacy expansion, suggested a drive to “eradicate adult illiteracy in 
Georgia” in light of “the Draft Law show[ing] that our State is weakened mentally, morally, 
physically and financially by the large number of adult illiterates.”4 All members of the meeting 
agreed to a resolution to allot $10,000 of GCD funds (out of the $20,000 the Georgia Assembly 
allotted for 1919) toward a commission to study the problem “to the end that every adult person 
in this State may at least know how to read and write before the next census of 1920.”5 The 1919 
assembly eventually allotted the remainder of the unspent GCD budget, about $12,000, to that 
committee.6 The results of that illiteracy commission are beyond the range of this thesis, but the 
war had clearly identified an embarrassing trend in Georgia’s populace for which the state sought 
an immediate remedy. 
Thomas Hardwick’s Senate career ended in 1918 with his battering at the polls, but he 
was not dead politically. Despite a mail bomb addressed to him that exploded and maimed his 
maid at his home in Atlanta (one in a wave of unsolved domestic bombings or attempted bomb-
ings in April and May 1919 chalked up to radicalism and blamed on Bolsheviks),7 Hardwick’s 
political recovery was swift. In 1920, with the help of Tom Watson, Hardwick—that “friend of 
the Kaiser” and universal wartime opponent of Woodrow Wilson, hated by virtually every news-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Editorial, “Our Waterways,” Atlanta Constitution, 11 November 1923, C6. 
4 “Report of the Meeting of the State Council of Defense, Held at the Dempsey Hotel,” 11 February 1919, “Organi-
zation, 1917–1919,” RCB 56824, GCD. 
5 Ibid. 
6 “Georgia’s New School Laws: What They Are, What They Mean,” Atlanta Constitution, 15 August 1919, 10. 
7 Hagedorn, Savage Peace,” 184–85. 
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paper editor in Georgia—was elected governor on a platform to “return to the principles of gov-
ernment of Washington and Jefferson.” Among these principles were opposition to the League of 
Nations and compulsory military service, and support of freedom of speech.8  
Hardwick defended his wartime record as senator during the campaign season while the 
recently founded American Legion battered him in support of gubernatorial challenger Clifford 
Walker, Georgia’s former attorney general. Meanwhile, Hoke Smith defended his Senate seat 
from challenges by two-time Governor Hugh Dorsey and the reascending Tom Watson. News-
papers again decried Hardwick as a threat to southern democracy and backed Walker. This time, 
however, Georgia voters weren’t so easily shepherded. Hardwick won 78 counties in the primary 
to Walker’s 69.9 Georgia newspapers reiterated their support of Walker,10 but a runoff gave 
Hardwick the governorship by a two-thirds majority of counties.11 (Watson had defeated both 
Smith and Dorsey to win the Senate race outright by a wide majority in the initial primary.)12 
Despite months of doomsaying by the press, Tom Watson and Thomas Hardwick won back the 
political power they had lost during the war. 
The sudden turnaround of political fortune for these Georgia mavericks speaks to the 
changing attitudes and new prerogatives of Georgia voters after the war. Especially given Hard-
wick’s drubbing in his reelection campaign of 1918, the 1920 gubernatorial race is a clear indica-
tor of a break between the coercive influence of newspapers on public attitudes during the war 
and afterward. It is evidence of the way in which Georgia voters—many of whom clearly wanted 
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9 “Runover to Decide Governor,” Atlanta Constitution, 10 September 1920, 1. 
10 Editorial, “Leading Papers of Georgia Say Best Interests Demand Walker,” Atlanta Constitution, 28 September 
1920, 8. 
11 “Hardwick Winner in 104 Counties,” Atlanta Constitution, 8 October, 1920, 3. 
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Hardwick out of political office in 1918—were looking inward again at Georgia’s own interests 
once the threat of war was gone. 
The waning influence of newspaper editors in the 1920 Georgia election was a symptom 
of falling newspaper reputations nationwide after the war. The repercussions of the press’s un-
mitigated support of official doctrine by the Committee on Public Information during the war led 
to whole-scale changes in journalistic tactics and ethics in the 1920s. Media historian Burton St. 
John III notes that journalists felt guilty even by the end of the war for unquestioningly dissemi-
nating government propaganda and quickly recognized the damage done to newspaper credibility 
in the process.13 One of the biggest proponents for journalistic reform was one of the war years’ 
greatest journalistic culprits, Walter Lippman. During the war as a journalist, Lippman did a 
great deal toward increasing the reach and the power of the CPI. Later, however, he advocated 
that journalists “learn from the scientist’s detached posture of observation.” According to St. 
John, Lippman believed “journalism [could] provide a route to moderating the power of authori-
ty by encouraging news workers to report in an objective style, focusing on facts contextualized 
by experts.”14 Newspapers realized that the reliance on “news” from “unchecked experts” threat-
ened to mislead a democracy into “an ill-advised effort.”15 
Many opportunities for further study exist on the topic of Georgia’s support of the US 
war effort in World War I. This thesis explores several means by which Georgia government 
tried to influence citizens. One of the most common methods was to coerce compliance through 
laws, several of which I explored in chapter 1. Still, perhaps somewhere in Georgia municipali-
ties passed ordinances in opposition to the law. Though evidence in chapter 2 suggests wide-
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spread press support, more research is needed for a complete view of how much the press sup-
ported the war and how dissent and resistance—or even simple disagreement—appeared in 
newspapers outside of the common attacks on nationally known political figures.  
The Georgia Council of Defense records at the Georgia Archives are a treasure trove of 
information on the state’s efforts during the war. My extensive exploration in chapter 3 is still 
but a cursory peek at this collection. Gerald Shenk has studied the GCD Negro Organization files 
in depth, and I have endeavored to reveal much of the rest, but this group of records is ripe for 
further study. With regret I was unable to explore the collection’s Woman’s Committee records, 
for which an entire box of files exists, for this thesis because these local organizations fell direct-
ly under the national council rather than the state until very late in the war. 16 Many Bulletins and 
Correspondence files—the daily records, really, of the GCD—are interspersed throughout the 
boxes, and the Farm Furlough records17 surely reveal more about the labor struggles and agricul-
tural crisis in Georgia during the war. And who knows what may exist in county archives or in-
dividual collections throughout the state.  
I have challenged the conclusions of historians who have perhaps too heavily focused on 
resistance to the war and the draft on a federal level, but that does not mean my study of support 
and compliance cannot be reconciled with resistance studies. Dissent is extremely important in 
understanding how war affects a nation and its citizens; how people resist and what they are re-
sisting is integral to the story. Others have looked at southern resistance to national imperatives, 
yet the support demonstrated in this study by local and state governments in Georgia as well as 
by a significant portion of its citizens brings a new perspective to that story of resistance. Those 
who resisted the war did so within local contexts, where resistance to coercive measures brought 
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war opponents into direct conflict with neighbors and local officials. My evidence does not dis-
pute resistance; rather, it expands the background by which resistance studies may be viewed.  
The wartime experiences of Georgians cannot be lumped into simple categories of sup-
port or opposition. But those experiences are more multifaceted than many studies on resistance 
and dissent have allowed. Previously included as a part of the South where wartime resistance 
reigned, Georgia in fact helped foster a political and cultural coerced voluntarism among its pop-
ulation. World War I was a pivotal time period for the state. Through laws, watchful citizens, 
newspaper support, and a widespread yet conflicted network of defense councils, Georgia law-
makers and Georgia citizens navigated the war with a mixture of martial spirit and proud patriot-
ism as well as practical resistance and self-preservation. 
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APPENDIX: 
COMPARING THE ESPIONAGE ACT AND THE SEDITION ACT 
 
The bolded text in the Sedition Act indicates new or changed language from that in the 
original Espionage Act. Identical language is in plain roman text. Only section 3 of each act is 
compared here, as they are the most relevant to this study. 
 
Section 3, Espionage Act, passed June 19171 
“Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports 
or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval 
forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the Unit-
ed States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, 
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the 
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United 
States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 
twenty years, or both.” (122 words) 
 
 
Section 3, amended, Sedition Act, passed May 19182 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 40 Stat. 219 (1917–1919), Public Law 65-24 / Chapter 30, 65 Congress, Session 1, “An Act: To punish acts of in-
terference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espio-
nage, and better to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes.” Accessed 11 June 2013, 
HeinOnline.org, 
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.gsu.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.statute/sal040&size=2&collection=statute&index=sta
tdocs241&id=241 
2 40 Stat. 553 (1917–1919), Public Law 65-150 / Chapter 75, 65 Congress, Session 2, An Act: To amend section 
three, title one, of the Act entitled “An Act to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, 
and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the criminal laws of the 
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“Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports 
or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies, or shall willfully make or 
convey false reports, or false statements, or say or do anything except by way of bona fide 
and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with intent to obstruct the sale by the 
United States of bonds or other securities of the United States or the making of loans by or 
to the United States, and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or at-
tempt to cause or incite or attempt to incite, [sic] insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal 
of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct or attempt 
to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, and whoever, when the 
United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the 
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the 
flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any 
language intended to bring the form of government of the United States, or the Constitu-
tion of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of 
the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States into contempt, 
scorn, contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any language 
intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States, or to promote the 
cause of its enemies, or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willful-
ly by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
United States, and for other purposes,” approved June fifteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and for other pur-
poses. Accessed 11 June 2012, HeinOnline.org, 
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.gsu.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.statute/sal040&size=2&collection=statute&index=sta
tdocs575&id=575 
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any curtailment of production in this country of any thing or things, product or products, 
necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in which the United States may be en-
gaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the prose-
cution of the war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing 
of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act 
support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war or by 
word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not 
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both: Provided, That any 
employee or official of the United States Government who commits any disloyal act or ut-
ters any unpatriotic or disloyal language, or who, in an abusive and violent manner criti-
cizes the Army or Navy or the flag of the United States shall be at once dismissed from the 
service. Any such employee shall be dismissed by the head of the department in which the 
employee may be engaged, and any such official shall be dismissed by the authority having 
power to appoint a successor to the dismissed official.” (560 words) 
 
